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Abstract: We develop a simple model to study the interactions between a supplier’s financial constraints and 
contract  incompleteness  in  a  vertical  relationship.  Production  complexity  increases  the  extent  of  contract 
incompleteness and the hold-up problem, which generates a cost when the supplier needs financial participation 
from  the  downstream  firm.  Vertical  integration  alleviates  the  impact  of  financial  constraints  but  reduces  the 
supplier’s incentives. We apply the model to an analysis of multinational firms’ sourcing strategies and predict that 
(1)  complex  and  specific  inputs  are  more  likely  to  be  sourced  from  financially  developed  countries  and ( 2 )  
multinationals are more likely to integrate suppliers located in countries with poor financial institutions, especially 
when trade involves complex goods. We examine and validate these predictions using firm-level trade data on 
multinational  firms  with  operations  in  France.  We  provide  evidence  that  financial  development  generates  a 
comparative advantage in the supply of complex goods. Moreover, we find higher shares of intra-firm imports of 
complex inputs from countries with a lower level of financial development. The findings are robust to different 
measures of complexity and specificity, and are not driven by industry differences in fixed costs or traditional 
measures of external financial dependence. Quantitatively, we find that financial development is as important as 
contract enforcement in alleviating hold-up problems. 
 
Keywords: sourcing, FDI, financial constraints, contractual frictions. 














Résumé:  Le  but  de  cet  article  est  d'analyser  comment  les  stratégies  d'approvisionnement  des  groupes 
multinationaux sont affectées par les contraintes de crédit de leurs fournisseurs et le développement financier des 
pays  dans  lesquels  ils  opèrent.  Nous  montrons  que  les  contraintes  financières  interagissent  avec  le  degré 
d'incomplétude des contrats dans la relation entre client et fournisseur. Le modèle prédit que la rentabilité de 
l'externalisation d'une partie de la production croit, ceteris paribus, avec le niveau de développement  financier du 
pays de destination. En particulier, cet effet est plus important dans les industries caractérisées par un haut 
niveau de complexité technologique et de spécificité des produits, c'est-à-dire avec une part plus importante 
d'investissements  et  de  tâches  que  l'on  ne  peut  spécifier  dans  un  contrat.  Nous  montrons  que  l'intégration 
verticale des fournisseurs soulage les contraintes financières, et qu'ainsi les échanges intra-groupe apparaissent 
pour des produits complexes, plus particulièrement lorsque les marchés locaux de capitaux sont imparfaits. Les 
prédictions du modèle sont alors testées et validées grâce à des données microéconomiques sur l'activité des 
entreprises multinationales localisées en France. 
 
Mots-clés : sous-traitance, IED, contraintes financières, frictions contractuelles.    
Code JEL : F10, O16, L23. 
 
 1 Introduction
The process of globalization is characterized by the growing fragmentation of production and the orga-
nization of ﬁrms’ activities on a global scale. A substantial amount of empirical evidence has documented
the importance of trade in intermediate goods in total world trade and the extent of vertical speciali-
zation (Yeats, 2001; Feenstra, 1998; Campa Goldberg, 1997; Hummels, Ishii and Yi, 2001). Moreover,
multinational ﬁrms account for a large proportion of world trade, with aﬃliated or independent partners. 1
Firms seeking to exploit cross-country diﬀerences in production costs interact with suppliers operating in
environments with varying levels of institutional quality. One important institutional dimension is access to
ﬁnance. Previous research has shown that it strongly impacts on investment, ﬁrm performance and exports
(King and Levine, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Manova, 2008). However, local ﬁnancial markets are
not the only source of ﬁnance for suppliers and there is also evidence of capital ﬂows from multinational
ﬁrms to aﬃliates as potential channels to overcome imperfections in local capital markets (Desai, Foley
and Hines, 2004).
The purpose of this paper is to analyze how multinational ﬁrms’ sourcing strategies are aﬀected by
suppliers’ ﬁnancial constraints and the ﬁnancial development of the countries in which they operate. We
show that ﬁnancial constraints interact with the extent of contract incompleteness in vertical trade. The
model predicts that the proﬁtability of oﬀshoring production increases, ceteris paribus, with the level of
ﬁnancial development of the destination country. In particular, this eﬀect is stronger in industries with
higher degrees of technological complexity and speciﬁcity, with greater dependence on non-contractible
investments and tasks. We show that vertical integration of the supplier alleviates ﬁnancial constraints,
and thus intra-ﬁrm trade arises in complex industries especially when local capital markets are imperfect.
The model’s main empirical predictions are then tested and validated against ﬁrm-level trade data on the
operations of multinational ﬁrms located in France.
Recent theoretical and empirical research has established that contractual frictions are strong determi-
nants of trade patterns and the cross-border organization of ﬁrms (see Antras and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008).
Wide variations are observed in the extent of contract incompleteness and its impact, depending on the
type of product that is traded. In particular, the level of product complexity appears to be one of the
main determinants of contract incompleteness. 2 In our model, complex products refer to goods involving
a higher proportion of complex tasks and components that cannot be fully described in a contract. We
focus on one supplier producing an input for one ﬁnal good producer – the multinational ﬁrm. The greater
the product complexity, the greater the hold-up problem ex post between both parties. A multinational
sourcing complex inputs only secures a limited fraction of ex-post gains while the upstream party captures
a positive rent. Therefore, the multinational refrains from ﬁnancing the supplier’s initial costs and may
even ask ex ante for a compensating transfer (e.g. licensing fee). Because of this, the supplier’s need for
initial liquidity is inherently related to the level of input complexity. Supplying complex products calls
for adequate ﬁnancial capacity whereas the production of basic inputs can rely on co-ﬁnancing from the
multinational.
As is well known from the property rights theory of the ﬁrm (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and
1. About 67% of French imports and 75% of French exports in 1999 concerned manufacturing groups controlling at least
50% of a foreign aﬃliate. Similar patterns are observed for the US. Moreover, one-third of world trade is intra-ﬁrm (UNCTAD
2002). This proportion is even higher for developed countries : nearly half of US trade occurs within ﬁrms’ boundaries.
2. Hart and Moore (1999) and Segal (1999) present theoretical grounds for the existence of incomplete contracts by
incorporating the notion of complexity.
2Moore, 1990), one way of solving the problems of incomplete contracts is with a suitable allocation of
ownership. The theory posits that eﬃciency requires residual property rights to be assigned to the party
whose non-contractible investments have the greatest marginal eﬀect on the joint value. In the absence of
credit constraints, the supplier should remain independent assuming that speciﬁc investments are essential
to produce the intermediate input. Capital market frictions, however, limit the supplier’s capacity to ﬁnance
the initial cost of outsourcing with the multinational ﬁrm. In this case, we show that allocating residual
property rights to the multinational ﬁrm reduces the need for supplier’s ﬁnancial participation. Therefore,
vertical integration can arise as an equilibrium organizational form, even when it is suboptimal in terms
of productive eﬃciency.
An important determinant of ﬁnancial constraints is the level of ﬁnancial development of the country in
which the supplier is located. In the model, the upstream producer operates in an environment plagued with
ﬁnancial frictions that impose a bound on its access to liquidity. In addition to their initial contribution,
we assume that suppliers can raise debt from local banks, depending on the level of ﬁnancial development.
A higher level of ﬁnancial development is characterized by a larger proportion of pledgeable future income.
A ﬁrst prediction of the model is that imperfect capital markets have a particular eﬀect on complex input
oﬀshoring decisions. We look at diﬀerential eﬀects across industries and show that ﬁnancial development
generates a comparative advantage in the supply of complex inputs. The grounds for this can be seen from
Figure 1. The graph shows that the share of exports in complex industries (broadly speaking : machinery,
equipment and chemicals) is highly correlated with the level of ﬁnancial development. 3
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The model also predicts that the share of intra-ﬁrm imports by multinational ﬁrms should be higher in
countries with lower levels of ﬁnancial development. Moreover, this eﬀect should be more pronounced for
3. Figure 1 : World trade ﬂows in manufacturing goods in 1999 are drawn from CEPII at the 2-digit level of ISIC Revision
3. According to the OECD STAN deﬁnition of high and medium-high technology manufactures, complex industries correspond
to codes 24 and 29 to 35 (more reﬁned measures are used in the empirical section). Financial development is measured as the
ratio of private credit to GDP (Beck et al.,2 0 0 0 ) .W ef o c u so nt h e1 0 0l a r g e s tc o u n t r i e si nt e r m so fp o p u l a t i o nw i t hd a t ao n
private credit. The coeﬃcient of the linear trend is 0.366 (std error : 0.033).
3complex inputs. Multinational ﬁrms should be more likely to integrate their suppliers as a means to alleviate
their ﬁnancial constraints and reduce exposure to opportunism in countries where ﬁnancial development
is low. Complex industries are those where the costs of outsourcing are higher for the reasons described
above, and thus where ﬁnancial constraints are more likely to bind.
The model’s predictions are tested in the empirical section of the paper. We use data on imports by
multinational ﬁrms located in France (manufacturing groups with at least one aﬃliate abroad), detailed by
ﬁrm, product and country of origin. An important feature of these data is that they provide the proportion
of intra-ﬁrm trade for each observation. Our econometric analysis shows that multinational ﬁrms are less
likely to trade complex inputs with suppliers located in countries with lower levels of ﬁnancial development.
Furthermore, when ﬁnancial development is low, imports of complex inputs are more likely to occur within
the bounds of the ﬁrm, from an aﬃliate. These ﬁndings are robust to diﬀerent measures of ﬁnancial
development and complexity : R&D intensity measured in France and the UK, the Lall (2000) index
of technological content and the Rauch (1999) classiﬁcation of diﬀerentiated versus homogeneous goods.
Moreover, our results persist after the inclusion of ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects and are not driven by reverse causality.
Quantitatively, ﬁnancial development has a statistically and economically signiﬁcant impact on imports,
depending on the complexity of the traded good. We estimate that a one standard deviation change in
our index of ﬁnancial development yields a 9% increase in the probability of imports of complex goods
compared to basic goods (with a diﬀerence of one standard deviation in the index of complexity). This
eﬀect is larger than or comparable to the eﬀect of contract enforcement on the composition of imports.
Our paper contributes to the literature on institutions and trade (Acemoglu et al., 2007; Levchenko,
2007; Costinot, 2007; Nunn, 2007) and more speciﬁcally on ﬁnancial development and trade (Beck, 2003;
Becker and Greenberg, 2005; Manova, 2006 and 2008; Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2005). The main idea behind
most studies in this literature is that potential exporters with high initial costs need external ﬁnance,
unless they have a suﬃcient amount of cash in hand (Beck 2002; Chaney, 2005; Manova, 2006; Becker
and Greenberg, 2007). 4 This view, however, overlooks the fact that a large proportion of trade involves
multinational ﬁrms that can directly ﬁnance their suppliers’ initial costs, especially when the supplier is
an aﬃliate. By contrast, in our model, the need for external ﬁnance is the result of a tension between
suppliers and multinational ﬁrms when production relies on complex tasks and components that cannot be
described in contracts. In very recent work, Basco (2008) studies the role of ﬁnancial development in the
product cycle in international trade and suggests that ﬁnancial development interacts with the intensity in
headquarter services to determine the location of production. 5 Our empirical results support, however, the
notion put forward by our theory that ﬁnancial development creates a comparative advantage in complex
and speciﬁc goods. In our data, the impact of ﬁnancial development is not driven by interactions with
the traditional index of external ﬁnancial dependence (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), alternative measures of
ﬁxed costs, or diﬀerent indices of headquarter intensity. Moreover, our estimates suggest a stronger role of
ﬁnancial development compared to the rule of law and intellectual property rights.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the determinants of intra-ﬁrm trade. It is the ﬁrst to
examine (theoretically and empirically) the role of ﬁnancial constraints and ﬁnancial development on the
share of intra-ﬁrm trade. Previous theoretical studies have analyzed the role of intellectual property rights
4. Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) is the ﬁrst theory on ﬁnancial development and trade, where better ﬁnancial institutions
generate a comparative advantage in ﬁnancially dependent sectors.
5. The intensity in headquarter services is deﬁned as in Antras (2005). However, Basco (2008) does not consider the choice
between outsourcing and integration.
4(Ethier and Markusen, 1996), capital endowments (Antras, 2003) and contract enforcement (Antras and
Helpman, 2008), 6 but our empirical analysis suggests that ﬁnancial development plays a comparable if not
greater role. Moreover, our model combines predictions on comparative advantage and intra-ﬁrm trade in a
simple way. Integration of the supplier eases ﬁnancial constraints by taking formal control of the production
of complex products when the supplier is located in a country with poor ﬁnancial institutions. A diﬀerent
mechanism is at work in the recent model developed by Antras, Desai and Foley (2008) to analyze the
role of weak investor protection in the horizontal FDI versus technology licensing decision (agents do not
trade), where direct ﬁnancial participation by the multinational is considered by the local bank to be a
guarantee of monitoring (in line with Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).
Recently, Machiavello (2007) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (forthcoming)h a v es t u d i e dh o w
contracting costs and ﬁnancial development interact in the determination of ﬁrms’ boundaries in a clo-
sed economy, using cross-country data. 7 Applying these questions to international trade turns up some
interesting and proper identiﬁcation strategies absent from closed economy studies. An analysis of the
choice of import origin permits to identify the impact of the suppliers’ environment independently from
the location of the downstream ﬁrm. In addition, it permits to observe variations in the size of imports
and sourcing modes (integration or outsourcing) by country of origin for the same downstream ﬁrm. Our
empirical study thus draws on direct information on sourcing mode by ﬁrm, whereas the abovementioned
studies have to rely on indirect measures of vertical integration such as those calculated on the basis of
input-output matrices and the ratio of value added to total sales.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a model that formalizes the interactions between
a multinational ﬁrm and a supplier in an incomplete contract setting, where the latter has limited access
to ﬁnance. We also discuss some extensions of the baseline model. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis
based on ﬁrm-level trade data on French multinational ﬁrms. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theory
2.1 A simple model
Our model is based on a simpliﬁed version of the Antras and Helpman (2008) model of global sourcing,
incorporating capital market frictions on the supplier’s side.
Production : basic and complex tasks
We consider two agents in a vertical relationship : a downstream ﬁrm (referred to as the“multinational
ﬁrm”, labeled M) and the manager of a local upstream ﬁrm (the “supplier”, labeled S). The supplier
produces an intermediate good that is traded to the multinational ﬁrm, which then produces and sells the
ﬁnal good.
6. The main predictions made by Antras (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004, 2008) have been empirically checked by
Yeaple (2006), Nunn and Treﬂer (2008), and Bernard et al. (2008) using data on US multinational ﬁrms and by Defever and
Toubal (2007) and Corcos, Irac, Mion and Verdier (2008) using the SESSI dataset on French multinational ﬁrms, which we
also use in our empirical analysis. However, none of them considers the level of ﬁnancial development.
7. More broadly, our theory is also related to the literature on the interactions between ﬁnancial constraints and control
in corporate ﬁnance, ﬁrst developed by Aghion and Bolton (1992) and later applied in Aghion and Tirole (1994) and Legros
and Newman (2003), among others. Our model focuses on vertical relationships, but the mechanism presents similarities with
the trade-oﬀ between debt and control, where the investor prefers to take control of the ﬁrm when the entrepreneur cannot
raise enough debt.
5Total revenues from ﬁnal good sales equal Y = A1−ρQρ where Q denotes the volume of production
and A is a constant that reﬂects the perceived demand schedule. This expression can be derived from
the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition with constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
between ﬁnal goods. We denote the elasticity of substitution by σ = 1
1−ρ > 1, with 0 <ρ<1 measuring
the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
The multinational ﬁrm needs one unit of an input to produce one unit of a ﬁnal good. In turn, the
supplier needs to undertake a continuum of tasks to produce the intermediate good. We normalize to one
the measure of the set of tasks. Each task can be taken to be the production of a single component of the
intermediate good.
There are two types of task : complex and basic. Contrary to basic tasks, complex tasks are speciﬁc and
cannot be fully described in a contract. They correspond to attributes and components of the intermediate
good that are not veriﬁable by a third party. We denote by θ the proportion of complex tasks required for
the production of the input. θ is thus a parameter that characterizes the input’s industry.
Each task i demands an eﬀort from the supplier, denoted xi. The unit cost of eﬀort put into each task
is constant and denoted by c. We assume that the production technology is represented by a CES function










where I refers to the set of tasks and 1
1−ρ￿ > 1 to the elasticity of substitution. Symmetrically, the level of
eﬀort is the same for all complex tasks and all basic tasks respectively. We denote by e the level of eﬀort
in complex tasks and by q the level of eﬀort in basic tasks.
We assume, for the sake of argument, that the elasticity of substitution between tasks is the same as it
is between ﬁnal goods (ρ = ρ￿), producing a simple linear form for the value of total sales. This assumption
allows us to obtain a simple linear expression of total revenues as a function of the degree of complexity : 8
Y = A1−ρ [θeρ +( 1−θ)qρ]
Total costs sum up to :
C = θce+( 1−θ)cq
Notice that we do not rely on the assumption of ﬁxed costs, but they could simply be added to this
framework.
Organizational form and ex post bargaining
The inability to contract on the level of investment e in complex tasks results in ex-post bilateral
bargaining over the surplus. Eﬀorts in all tasks are implemented by the supplier before the bargaining
stage. However, in the event that no agreement is reached in the bargaining stage, eﬀorts in complex tasks
8. Note that the linearity in θ in the expression for Y comes from the equality between both elasticities of substitution. In
Section 2.3 we discuss a more general framework and show that our main mechanisms remain. Nevertheless, in the general
case it is not possible to obtain closed-form solutions. Similar linear forms have been put forward by Acemoglu, Aghion,
Griﬃth and Zilibotti (2005) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (forthcoming). Alternatively, we can obtain such a linear
expression by assuming that only one task has to be performed, characterized by a probability 1 − θ of being veriﬁable and
ap r o b a b i l i t yθ of being non-veriﬁable. In this speciﬁcation, the results would remain qualitatively similar.
6can be wiped out by the supplier, while eﬀorts in basic tasks must follow the contract’s speciﬁcations.
We model the bargaining game using the Nash bargaining solution with symmetric bargaining shares.
When negotiations are through, each party obtains half of the quasi-rents generated by the partnership plus
its outside option, represented by the value of the better alternative available in the event of no agreement
(threat point).
In keeping with Grossman and Hart (1986), outside options are assumed to be contingent on the pre-
vailing organizational structure, determined by the party that is assigned the property rights over the
input. We consider two forms of organizational structure. Under a non-integration, or “outsourcing” ar-
rangement, the supplier retains residual property rights. Nevertheless, we suppose that eﬀorts in complex
tasks are speciﬁc and sunk, which implies that the supplier’s outside option is zero, irrespective of orga-
nizational form. Analytically, outside outsourcing options are given by the ﬁrst line of the following table : 9
Outside options Supplier S Multinational M
Outsourcing 0 A1−ρ(1−θ)qρ
Vertical Integration 0 A1−ρ(1−δ)θeρ + A1−ρ(1−θ)qρ
The alternative organizational arrangement is (backward) vertical integration, in which M incorporates
S as an internal unit (aﬃliate), hires the manager as the head of this unit and retains ownership of the
assets in the event of no agreement. In this case, then, the multinational could ﬁre the manager and replace
him with someone else. This constitutes its threat point in the ex-post negotiations. We assume that this
would occur at the cost of losing part of the value of the complex components, which would be reduced
by a proportion δ<1. As mentioned, the supplier’s outside option is zero under vertical integration.
Analytically, we obtain the expressions in the second line of the above table.
At this point, it is worth noting that organizational form does not directly impact on the production
function (there is no ad-hoc ﬁxed cost of integration). It only directly aﬀects the value of outside options.
Financial constraints
Lastly, an important feature of our model is the fact that capital markets are assumed to work only
imperfectly. In particular, the supplier may be ﬁnancially constrained at the time of starting to do business
with the multinational ﬁrm. The multinational ﬁrm, on the other hand, is assumed to have access to both
foreign and domestic ﬁnancial markets and thus not to face liquidity constraints at all.
Limited available funds reduce the supplier’s ability to make initial investments. More speciﬁcally,
liquidity constraints impose a bound on the sum of initial costs C and the upfront payment T that can be
asked initially by the multinational ﬁrm. Note that T may be either positive or negative. Negative transfers
reﬂect the extent of co-ﬁnancing whereas positive transfers represent a participation fee (e.g. royalties or
licensing fees for the use of the multinational’s technology).
We assume that the supplier’s level of initial liquidity is made up of two elements. One is initial holdings
of cash, summed up by parameter W. In addition, the supplier can raise debt L from local banks.
9. Our model would remain qualitatively unchanged if we were to relax the assumption of symmetry. In section 2.3, we
relax the assumption that eﬀorts in complex tasks are speciﬁc (e.g. eﬀorts of technology assimilation), which yields similar
conclusions to the baseline model. In a similar framework, Feenstra and Hanson (2005) estimate a bargaining power of 0.7
for the multinational ﬁrm and 0.3 for the local ﬁrm. These values, however, are not statistically diﬀerent from 0.5.
7The fact that both the initial transfer T and production costs C are limited by available liquidity
implies the following liquidity constraint :
T + C ≤ W + L
How much the supplier can borrow from local banks depends on the level of ﬁnancial development,
indexed by a parameter κ ∈ [0,1]. Speciﬁcally, if the supplier’s future revenues equal YS, the maximum
amount of debt L that can be raised from local banks is limited by the ﬁnancial constraint :
L ≤ κYS
In other words, κ is the ratio of pledgable income to total expected income. Thus, a value of κ = 1 indicates
perfect capital markets, whereas κ = 0 indicates no capital market.
Various micro-economic theories can explain the presence of ﬁnancial constraints. Models of credit
rationing are based mainly on the non-observability of outcomes (for example, Aghion, Banerjee and
Piketty, 1999; and Schneider and Tornell, 2004), investment decisions (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) and
individual capabilities (Jaﬀe and Stiglitz, 1990). In keeping with ex-post moral hazard models, our variable
κ can be interpreted as the cost of diverting the funds and not repaying the debt. Alternatively, we could
model ﬁnancial development as the eﬃciency of monitoring to prevent unproductive decisions (Antras,
Desai and Foley, 2008). With either approach, the conclusions of our model would remain qualitatively
similar.
In the baseline speciﬁcation, we assume that repayment of the debt is not contingent on whether
an agreement is reached with the multinational ﬁrm. In Section 2.3, we explore the alternative route and
assume that repayment of the debt depends on the agreement between the supplier and the multinational. 10
Note that we do not assume that vertical integration has a direct impact on the availability of external
ﬁnance. For example, we could assume that stricter monitoring by the multinational ﬁrm allows for a higher
level of debt from local banks. Such assumptions, however, yield very similar results regarding the choice
between outsourcing and integration, as shown in Section 2.2.
Timing
Before moving on to the solution of the model, we present the timing of events :
1. The multinational proposes a contract to the supplier specifying a triplet (Z,T,q)w h e r eZ is the
organizational form, T an upfront monetary transfer from S to M and q the level of eﬀort for the
basic tasks. The upfront payment T is restricted by the supplier’s initial level of liquidity (debt and
initial capital).
2. Transfer T takes place.
3. The supplier decides its level of eﬀort e and produces the input, under the constraint that total cost
can not exceed available liquidity.
4. Nash bargaining on the value of joint production and repayment of the external debt take place.
10. Whether the debt is raised from the multinational ﬁrm or from local banks makes no diﬀerence in the baseline spe-




The multinational’s total proﬁts equal its ex-post revenues plus the ex-ante transfer. The contract chosen
maximizes total proﬁts subject to three constraints : a participation constraint imposing non-negative
total proﬁts on the supplier, the ﬁnancial constraints discussed previously, and an incentive compatibility
constraint reﬂecting the supplier’s decision in terms of speciﬁc investments in complex tasks.
In formal terms, M chooses the triplet (Z,q,T) that solves the following constrained maximization
problem :
max Π = Y Z
M + T
Z,q,T
s.t. T ≤ Y Z
S − C (Participation constraint, PC)
T ≤ W + κY Z
S − C (Financial constraint, FC)
e = argmaxe {Y Z
S − C } (Incentive compatibility constraint, IC)
where C = θce+(1−θ)cq is the cost of eﬀort, and Y Z
M, Y Z
S are revenues after bargaining. Ex-post revenues
are functions of e, q and the organizational form Z ∈{ O,I} as we show in the next paragraph.
Bargaining outcomes
In the case of an outsourcing arrangement, the multinational’s outside option equals revenues related
to basic tasks, as production related to complex tasks is lost in the event of disagreement. Given symmetric
bargaining power, ex-post revenues for the multinational ﬁrm and the supplier (before repayment of the
debt) equal respectively :
Y o
M = 1




Under vertical integration, ex-post payoﬀs to both parties change in line with the new allocation of
residual property rights. Given the eﬀort put into the complex and basic tasks, the multinational ﬁrm












Investments in complex and basic tasks
In this framework, investments in speciﬁc tasks are determined by the organizational form. Under the
incentive compatibility constraint (IC), investments made by the supplier in complex tasks maximize its
ex-post revenues Y Z
S minus costs C,w h e r eZ ∈{ I,O} refers to the organizational form. Under outsourcing,
the level of eﬀort equals :
eo(c)=aρ(2c)−σ (1)
where a = Aρσ−1 is a constant and coeﬃcient 2 in brackets comes from the symmetric Nash bargaining
solution. The fact that the supplier’s bargaining power is strictly below one implies that it does not recover
the full marginal return on its investments. Thus, the level of non-contractible eﬀort is below the ﬁrst best
even in cases where liquidity constraints do not bind.
9Under integration, the supplier only retains a fraction δ
2 of ex-post revenues in the bargaining stage.
Given this, the optimal level of non-contractible eﬀort is a function of the unit cost of eﬀort and holds :
eI(c)=aρδσ(2c)−σ <e o(c)
Eﬀorts are lower than under outsourcing. The underinvestment problem is exacerbated because the supplier
captures a smaller share of the ex-post surplus.
Compared to complex tasks, eﬀorts in basic tasks are contractible and it can be easily shown that the
ﬁrst-best level is achieved, irrespective of the organizational choice :
qo(c)=qI(c)=aρc−σ (2)
Note that, in this simple framework, eﬀorts are not directly aﬀected by ﬁnancial constraints for a given
organizational structure. Moreover, eﬀorts in complex and basic tasks do not interact and do not depend
on the proportion of complex tasks. 11
Given these expressions of the level of eﬀort, computing ex-post revenues for each party is a straightfor-
ward exercise. The supplier’s ex-post revenues are strictly lower under integration than under outsourcing.
This is due to the smaller share of revenues obtained by the supplier in the bargaining stage and the lower
value of production (eﬀorts are lower under integration). However, the multinational’s ex-post revenues
are not necessarily lower under integration as the multinational can capture a larger share of production
value. 12
Initial transfers : co-ﬁnancing versus licensing fees
The initial transfer T plays a key role. In our set-up, T is deﬁned as a payment from the supplier to the
multinational ﬁrm. Yet this payment can be negative, reﬂecting a monetary ﬂow from the multinational to
the supplier. In analytical terms, T is determined by the participation constraint (PC) and the ﬁnancial
constraint (FC), which impose an upper bound on the level of the ex-ante transfer T.
When the ﬁnancial constraint is slack, the ex-ante transfer is directly determined by equality in the
participation constraint. This equals the supplier’s ex-post revenues net of the costs of all tasks, and can







(2c)1−σ − a(1−θ)ρc 1−σ
Under integration, the lower level of eﬀort and the smaller share of revenues secured by the upstream ﬁrm














can be either positive or negative and increase with the degree of complexity θ :
11. The baseline model’s main ﬁndings are robust to alternative structures. The ﬁrst extension of the model in Section (2.3)
allows for a positive outside option for the supplier. In some cases, where outside options are large, investments in complex
eﬀorts are constrained by available liquidity and do not maximize the supplier’s ex-post revenues. The last extension of the
model examines a more general framework and discusses a generalization of our results when eﬀorts in complex and basic
tasks are interdependent.
12. The multinational’s ex-post revenues are higher under integration when ρ<1/2a n dδ is close enough to one.
10– When production relies essentially on basic tasks (θ = 0), the multinational ﬁrm can ﬁnance all of
the supplier’s initial costs because there is no hold-up problem and it is able to capture all ex-post
revenues. In this case, T is strictly negative, reﬂecting an initial transfer from the multinational ﬁrm
to the supplier (co-ﬁnancing).
– Conversely, when production is complex and θ is closer to one, the supplier retains a larger share
of the ex-post surplus. Instead of co-ﬁnancing, positive ex-ante transfers are used to extract the
supplier’s rent when it exceeds the cost of initial investments (when the production technology is
new and speciﬁc to the multinational, this payment can be interpreted as a licensing fee).
– The more complex production is, the greater the diﬀerence between outsourcing and integration in
terms of optimal transfer (ownership only aﬀects revenues and investments related to complex tasks).
At this point, it is quite intuitive that the supplier’s access to ﬁnance will have a larger impact when
there is a larger proportion θ of complex and non-contractible tasks. Moreover, ﬁnancial constraints are
less likely to aﬀect the ex-ante transfer under integration compared to outsourcing, especially for complex
tasks.
When are ﬁnancial constraints binding? The ﬁnancial constraint (FC) imposes an upper bound on the
ex-ante transfer, depending on the debt from local banks and available liquidity. Formally, the ﬁnancial
constraint (FC) is binding when the optimal transfer T
Z
(θ,c) does not satisfy the inequality in (FC). This
occurs when initial capital is below a threshold W
Z
(θ,c,κ).





The possibility of ﬁnancial constraints being binding arises when the threshold is strictly positive, i.e. when
the production of the input involves complex tasks (θ>0) and the ﬁnancial markets are imperfect (κ<1).
The higher the complexity θ and the lower the level of ﬁnancial development κ, the greater the likelihood
of the ﬁnancial constraint being binding, for a given W – this is consistent with prior remarks on the level
of optimal transfer.








Financial constraints are less likely under integration because the multinational can retain a larger share of
ex-post revenues and asks for less compensation. In addition, the value of production is lower than under
outsourcing.





< 0 for Z ∈{ I,O}
for Z ∈{ I,O}. Intuitively, ﬁnancial constraints are less likely to be binding for suppliers in ﬁnancially
developed countries. This eﬀect, however, depends on the type of input that is supplier. We obtain the
following proposition :
Proposition 1. (i) The eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on the wealth threshold W
Z
(θ,c,κ) is stronger




< 0 for Z ∈{ I,O}
(ii) The threshold W
Z





In words, ﬁnancial constraints are more likely to be binding for a low level of ﬁnancial development,
especially when production involves complex inputs. Moreover, ﬁnancial constrains are more likely to be
binding under outsourcing, compared to integration.
When the ﬁnancial constraint is binding, the participation constraint (PC) is slack and the initial
transfer T is determined by the constraint (FC). Hence, when W<W
o
(θ,c,κ) under outsourcing, initial





(2c)1−σ − a(1−θ)ρc 1−σ < T
o
(θ,c)





(2c)1−σ − a(1−θ)ρc 1−σ < T
I
(θ,c)
Naturally, when both initial capital W and ﬁnancial development κ are low, we observe a lower transfer
T.W h e nT becomes negative, it reﬂects the extent of co-ﬁnancing when the supplier has little access to
ﬁnance. Moreover, T is more likely to be negative under integration, in which case T can be interpreted
as foreign direct investment. This result is consistent with Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) who ﬁnd larger
ﬁnancial participation by multinationals in aﬃliates located in countries with poor ﬁnancial markets.
Multinational ﬁrm’s proﬁts
In the benchmark case where W is large and capital markets are frictionless, the ﬁnancial constraint
(FC) is slack. The only restraint on the actions of the multinational ﬁrm is the necessity to ensure the
supplier’s participation (ensuring that the supplier gets non-negative proﬁts). In this case, the multinational
is able to extract the entire surplus from the relationship and total proﬁts equal total revenues Y minus








2 )(2c)1−σ + a(1−θ)(1−ρ)c1−σ (6)




(θ,c). In this case, the preferred organizational form is the one that maximizes
non-contractible eﬀorts by the upstream unit. Ex-post marginal beneﬁts for the supplier are maximal when
it remains independent, making outsourcing the optimal choice.
When the ﬁnancial constraint is binding, the multinational is unable to extract the entire surplus.
Proﬁts equal the sum of ex-post revenues and initial transfer T, which is aﬀected by the lack of initial
capital W or poor ﬁnancial markets κ. Under outsourcing, the ﬁnancial constraint is more likely to be
12binding (when W<W
o
(θ,c,κ)), in which case we obtain :
Πo(W,κ,θ,c)=W + aθ( 1+κ−ρ
2 )(2c)1−σ + a(1−θ)(1−ρ)c1−σ (7)
Under integration, ﬁnancial constraints may also be binding (when W<W
I
(θ,c,κ)) and we obtain :
ΠI(W,κ,θ,c)=W + δσ−1aθ( 2−δ+δκ−δρ
2 )(2c)1−σ + a(1−θ)(1−ρ)c1−σ (8)
When ﬁnancial constraints are binding, proﬁts depend on both κ and θ. These proﬁts are strictly
lower than maximal proﬁts when ﬁnancial constraints are slack. Moreover, we can note that only revenues
related to complex tasks are aﬀected by ﬁnancial constraints. Hence, the eﬀects of ﬁnancial constraints on
the multinational ﬁrm’s proﬁts increase with the complexity of the tasks. Formally, we obtain the following
proposition :
Proposition 2. When the ﬁnancial constraint is binding, the multinational ﬁrm’s proﬁts increase with
the level of ﬁnancial development of the country in which the supplier operates, especially when production






> 0 for Z ∈{ I,O}
Proposition 2 complements Proposition 1, which also emphasizes the interaction between κ and θ,b y
highlighting how ﬁnancial development and complexity aﬀect the proﬁtability of oﬀshoring production.
Financial development allows the multinational ﬁrm to recover ex ante the proportion of proﬁts that are
retained by the supplier. This proportion is higher the higher the complexity of production. Therefore, an
increase in the level of ﬁnancial development has a stronger impact on the multinational’s proﬁts when
the intermediate good is more complex. Interestingly, ﬁnancial development can have a negative impact
on the supplier’s proﬁts because it reduces her rents, which are positive only when the ﬁnancial constraint
is binding.
Financial constraints and organizational choice
We can now roll back the clock to the moment when the multinational ﬁrm makes its decision about
the optimal organizational form. Vertical integration is preferred when proﬁts under outsourcing are lower
compared to proﬁts under integration.





whatever c and θ. As already discussed, ownership delivers greater incentives to the supplier, and the
value of the joint surplus can be recovered by the multinational ﬁrm through ex-ante payments, which are
maximal in this case.
However, the possibility of obtaining ex-ante compensation vanishes as ﬁnancial constraints start to
bind under outsourcing. Conversely, ﬁnancial constraints are less likely to bind under integration. When
the ﬁnancial constraint under integration is not binding (W<W
I
(θ,c,κ)) but initial capital is below a




13vertical integration becomes the preferred organizational form. By comparing expressions (5) and (7), we
ﬁnd the following expression for the threshold WI/O :
WI/O(θ,c,κ)=aθ(2c)1−σ ￿
δσ−1(1− δρ




Moreover, we can show that the ﬁnancial constraint is not binding under integration when the multinational







(θ,c,κ) ≤ WI/O(θ,c,κ) < W
o
(θ,c,κ)
When initial capital is below WI/O, vertical integration is chosen because its costs in terms of productive
eﬃciency are outweighed by the larger fraction of ex-post surplus that the multinational retains under
integration. Vertical integration thus emerges as a device to alleviate the negative eﬀects of the supplier’s
ﬁnancial constraints.
As shown in Propositions 1 and 2, ﬁnancial constraints are strongest when the level of ﬁnancial deve-
lopment is low and the degree of complexity is high. Hence, we ﬁnd that WI/O is aﬀected both by the
level of ﬁnancial development κ and the complexity of production θ, and also by their interaction. This
property is a key feature of our model :
Proposition 3 The eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on the organizational threshold WI/O(θ,c,κ) is







The main intuition behind Proposition 3 is that vertical integration enables the multinational ﬁrm to
retain a larger share of the ex-post surplus. Therefore, it reduces the need for ex-ante compensation and
lessens the impact of the supplier’s ﬁnancial constraint when ﬁnancial development is low and product
complexity is high.
Note that vertical integration is more likely to arise in complex industries, because ﬁnancial constraints




Lastly, notice that our results are not sensitive to hypotheses about the ﬁnancial structure under
integration. For various speciﬁcations about the availability of credit to the aﬃliated supplier, integration
emerges in order to mitigate negative eﬀects of ﬁnancial constraints under outsourcing. For example, the
same threshold WI/O is obtained if we assume perfect internal capital markets in the case of vertical
integration (no ﬁnancial constraint). Similarly, Proposition 3 remains true if we consider that the supplier
is not able to raise any debt in the case of integration, since it is just an employee of the aﬃliated ﬁrm.
13. In extreme cases of high ﬁnancial development with a sharp drop in the level of eﬀorts under integration, integration
does not arise regardless of W.F o r m a l l y ,t h i sh a p p e n sw h e nδσ−1 2−δ+δκ−δρ
2 < 1+κ−ρ
2 .
142.3 Robustness and generalizations
Constrained investments
In the baseline model the outside option of the supplier is assumed to be nil even in the case where
she retains residual property rights. In this extension, we relax this assumption and explore the case where
the supplier can derive proﬁts from investments in non-contractible tasks and components in the event of
disagreement. To be more precise, we denote by α>0 the proportion of proﬁts from complex tasks that
the supplier could secure if negotiations break down. 14
At the bargaining stage, a positive outside option for the supplier provides a higher treat point. This
implies that the share of ex-post surplus received by the supplier is increased and the share of ex-post surplus
received by the multinational is reduced. Formally, the share of the value of complex tasks obtained ex post
by the supplier equals 1+α
2 > 1
2 (under symmetric Nash bargaining), whereas the multinational retains a
fraction 1 − 1+α
2 < 1
2 after bargaining. When ﬁnancial constraints are not binding, the multinational can
recover the entire surplus by asking for adequate ex-ante transfers. Moreover, higher α provides higher
incentives to invest and thus increases the total value of the relationship. Nevertheless, a new mechanism
appears in the case of binding ﬁnancial constraints, by which eﬀorts under outsourcing can be directly
aﬀected by the level of ﬁnancial constraints.
When initial liquidity is scarce, ﬁnancing higher levels of investments reduces the capacity of the supplier
to make compensating ex ante transfers to the multinational. As investments are increasing in the value of
outside options, they may become excessive from the multinational’s point of view when liquidity is low.
In such a situation, the multinational ﬁrm may ﬁnd it optimal to restrict the supplier’s available funds by
asking larger initial transfer, at the cost of reducing the supplier’s level of investment. We refer to this as
a ”constrained investments” situation.
Such a case arises when the level of investment that maximizes the multinational’s total proﬁts is lower
than the level of investment that maximizes the supplier’s ex post proﬁts. Eﬀort is constrained when the
total share of revenues from complex tasks received by the multinational is lower than the share of these
revenues secured by the supplier through bargaining. While the supplier’s share of ex-post revenues equals
1+α
2 , the multinational’s total share of revenues is the sum of ex-post revenues and the share of proﬁts that



















which is equivalent to κ< α
1+α . This condition can be satisﬁed when the level of ﬁnancial development
is low and the supplier’s outside option is large. However, when α = 0 (the special case described in the
baseline model), this condition never holds.
This potential eﬀect on investments does not alter the results from previous sections. In Appendix
A, we derive multinational’s proﬁts Πo and wealth thresholds W
o
and WI/O. In particular, we ﬁnd that
the eﬀects of ﬁnancial constraints increase with α because positive outside options exacerbate the hold-up
problem from the multinational’s point of view.
14. This parameter can be determined by technological conditions (i.e. the speciﬁcity of the production technology), or by
characteristics of the environment where the supplier operates such as the presence of other downstream ﬁrms in the market
(the“thickness”of the market), and the extent of intellectual property rights protection (the extent to which the non-licensed
technologies can be used by the supplier for other purposes).
15Contingent debt repayment and bargaining
We now discuss the case in which debt repayment by the supplier is conditional on negotiations with
the multinational being successful. This situation arises when the outside option of the supplier is nil and
the only source of revenues is given by the outcome of the negotiations. Thus, in the event of disagreement,
the supplier defaults on the debt. 15
When this situation is internalized by both parties, it interacts with the bargaining process and yields
diﬀerent bargaining outcomes. The interesting point is that the debt L aﬀects outside options and the
surplus generated by the relationship, and thus aﬀects ex post revenues. We ﬁnd that the supplier’s ex-
post revenues are increased by L
2 compared to the baseline model. Symmetrically, the multinational’s
ex-post revenues are decreased by L
2 . As the debt cannot exceed κ times the supplier’s ex-post revenues,




2 Aθeρ + 1
2 L
￿
We obtain that L = κ
2−κ Aθeρ, which is strictly higher than the maximum level of debt that can be raised
in the baseline case and given by κ
2 Aθeρ.
Thus, contingent repayment aﬀects the results in two ways : it induces a higher debt level but lower
ex-post revenues for the multinational, especially given a high level of ﬁnancial development. However, the
impact of ﬁnancial development on total proﬁts remains positive, especially for complex inputs (we show
in Appendix A that Propositions 1 to 3 still hold).
Interestingly, whether the debt is contracted with a local bank or the multinational ﬁrm matters in
such a case. In the event of default, the multinational’s position is worsened if it is the creditor, which
implies that it is optimal to sign the debt contract with an external agent rather between the supplier and
the multinational.
A general production function
In this last extension, we examine a more general setting. We now consider total revenues as a function
Y (e,q) of non-contractible eﬀorts e and contractible eﬀorts q. 16 We assume that costs are linear in both
types of eﬀorts : C = ce.e + cq.q. As in the baseline model, the multinational ﬁrm’s outside options under
outsourcing correspond to revenues when non-contractible tasks equal zero, Y (0,q), while the supplier’s
outside option is nil.
In this general framework, we ﬁnd that optimal investments in complex tasks are determined by the
supplier by a function e∗(q) of investments in basic tasks. In turn, investments in basic tasks are chosen by
the multinational ﬁrm as a function q∗(κ,W) of ﬁnancial development and initial capital W, by anticipating
the supplier’s choice. The reader is referred to Appendix A for the characterization of optimal choices in
terms of non-contractible and contractible tasks.
How does ﬁnancial development aﬀect optimal choices and proﬁts? First, by comparing both constraints,
we can show that the ﬁnancial constraint starts binding under outsourcing when initial capital is below
15. For simplicity, we assume in what follows that the supplier can default on the debt at no cost when the negotiation
breaks down.
16. We suppose that Y is increasing and concave in both types of eﬀorts e and q.T h eb a s e l i n em o d e lw o u l dc o r r e s p o n dt o












Y (e,q) − Y (0,q)
￿
where q = q∗(κ,∞) ≡ q∗ and e = e∗(q∗) are optimal investments when the ﬁnancial constraint is not
binding. The term
￿
Y (e,q) − Y (0,q)
￿
reﬂects the extent to which revenues rely on complex tasks. As in
the baseline model, this equality shows that ﬁnancial development has a negative impact on the wealth
threshold (ﬁnancial constraints are more likely to bind for a low level of ﬁnancial development) and that
the eﬀect is stronger when production relies on complex tasks (Proposition 1). 17
When the supplier has no initial capital (W = 0), only the ﬁnancial constraint is binding. In this case,
we can show that ﬁnancial development has a positive impact on the multinational’s proﬁts and that this






Y (e,q) − Y (0,q)
￿
> 0
where q = q∗(κ,0) and e = e∗(q∗(κ,0)).
Similarly, we can analyze the choice between outsourcing and integration, assuming that the multi-




in the event of disagreement with the supplier. As in the baseline
model, we obtain that outsourcing is preferred to integration unless ﬁnancial constraints are strong and
ﬁnancial development is low. The magnitude of the eﬀect however depends on whether both the participa-
tion constraint and the ﬁnancial constraint are binding at the point where the multinational is indiﬀerent
between outsourcing and integration. Assuming that in this case the ﬁnancial constraint is not binding







Y (e,q) − Y (0,q)
￿
< 0
where q = q∗(κ,0) and e = e∗(q∗(κ,0)). This also suggests that the impact of ﬁnancial development is
strongest when production relies on complex tasks (Proposition 3).
2.4 Empirical predictions
The model’s ﬁndings have direct implications in terms of optimal sourcing strategies. One of the main
factors that lead ﬁrms to oﬀshore production is the search for low labor costs, or low production costs
in general. However, our model suggests that, while lower production costs point to choosing locations
in developing countries, the proﬁtability of this strategy could be aﬀected by the ﬁnancial capacity of
suppliers and credit rationing by ﬁnancial institutions. By emphasizing diﬀerential eﬀects across industries,
depending on the proportion of complex tasks to be undertaken by the supplier, our model shows that the
eﬀects of ﬁnancial development are stronger in industries that are relatively more exposed to opportunism.
In the following, we illustrate some simple implications of the model in terms of sourcing strategies by
considering the decision to import a product from a foreign country depending on the level of ﬁnancial
development, degree of complexity, and relative cost of producing the good in the foreign country.
Formally, we suppose that the multinational has the choice between two suppliers : one at home and
17. However, the extent to which production depends on complex tasks is endogenous to both the technology and the
ﬁnancial constraints. It is not possible to derive simple comparative statics on an exogenous technological parameter θ in the
general case when ∂2Y
∂e∂q ￿=0 .
17one in a foreign country. We assume an imperfect capital market in the foreign country κ<1b u tn o
ﬁnancial friction at home. We normalize to one the unit cost of the home supplier and denote by c<1
the relative cost of the foreign supplier’s eﬀort. Hence, the home supplier has the advantage of no ﬁnancial
friction whereas the foreign supplier has lower eﬀort costs.
In this framework, the multinational ﬁrm can make one of three choices : (i) no import (outsourcing
from home supplier); 18 (ii) outsourcing to a foreign supplier; (iii) sourcing from an integrated foreign
supplier. Optimal strategies can be easily derived from expressions (5), (6) and (7). These choices are
illustrated in Graphs 2a and 2b.
When the traded good relies mainly on basic tasks (Figure 2a), the foreign supplier’s ﬁnancial constraints
are less likely to be binding and aﬀect the multinational ﬁrm’s proﬁts (Propositions 1 and 2). Hence the
multinational prefers to source inputs from abroad where production costs are lower even if the supplier
has little access to ﬁnance.
Conversely, when production is intensive in complex tasks (Figure 2b), ﬁnancial constraints are more
likely to aﬀect the multinational ﬁrm’s proﬁts (Propositions 1 and 2). When the foreign supplier is located in
a country with poor ﬁnancial institutions, the multinational will prefer to source inputs from home, unless
there is a very large diﬀerence in production costs. Thus, we derive the following empirical prediction :





















Prediction 1 Multinational ﬁrms are more likely to import inputs from a country with a higher level
of ﬁnancial development. This eﬀect is stronger for complex inputs.
By emphasizing diﬀerences across industries, our model shows that ﬁnancial development generates a
comparative advantage in the supply of complex inputs.
This prediction contrasts with previous theoretical studies (e.g. Beck, 2002; Manova, 2008; Becker
and Greenberg, 2007), suggesting that ﬁnancial development generates a comparative advantage in sectors
depending more heavily on external ﬁnance. The notion of dependence on external ﬁnance (Rajan and
Zingales, 1998) is generally conceived as the need to ﬁnance initial costs before proﬁts are generated, as
18. As ﬁnancial constraints are not binding for the home supplier, outsourcing is preferable. More general results could be
obtained by assuming imperfect capital markets at home, but the main predictions would hold as long as the home supplier
has better access to ﬁnance.
18opposed to sectors where initial costs are small and generated cash ﬂows are suﬃcient to ﬁnance most
investment. In our model, we account for the relationship between exporters and their customers who,
for two-thirds of international trade ﬂows, are multinational ﬁrms with broad access to liquidity. When
production is intensive in basic tasks and there is no risk of hold-up from the supplier, ﬁnancial development
has little eﬀect regardless of the level of initial costs.
Furthermore, our model can be used to make predictions about the sourcing mode : intra-ﬁrm or arm’s
length. In the case of basic goods (Figure 2a), outsourcing is the preferred organizational form for a wide
range of parameters. In the case of complex goods (Figure 2b), outsourcing is the optimal strategy only
when the foreign supplier is located in a country with high ﬁnancial development. When production costs
are very low but capital markets are poorly developed, it may still be proﬁtable to import, but integration
is chosen in order to alleviate the impact of ﬁnancial constraints.
Prediction 2 Intra-ﬁrm trade is more likely when the supplier is located in a country with a lower level
of ﬁnancial development. This eﬀect is stronger for complex inputs.
Last of all, note that our model makes the assumption that the supplier’s investments in basic and
complex tasks are essential to the production of the intermediate good. Unlike Antras (2003 and 2005) and
Antras and Helpman (2004 and 2008), there is no speciﬁc investment to be simultaneously implemented
by the multinational : the technology is decided on before the supplier is contracted and the multinational
transforms the intermediate good only after it is traded. Interestingly, our model can explain the emergence
of vertical integration and intra-ﬁrm trade without the assumption that there are simultaneous eﬀorts to
be made by the multinational ﬁrm which are more important than the supplier’s eﬀorts. 19
3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the data and then test the main predictions of the model using a
detailed ﬁrm-level dataset on international operations by multinational ﬁrms in France. First we analyze
how ﬁnancial development diﬀerently impacts the number of multinationals sourcing complex or basic
inputs across countries. Secondly, we study how the scale of imports in complex and basic goods responds
to the level of ﬁnancial development. Finally, we examine whether imports tend to occur within the ﬁrm
depending on a country’s ﬁnancial development and product complexity.
3.1 Data description
SESSI Database
Our analysis is based on a ﬁrm-level survey in France by SESSI (French Oﬃce of Industrial Studies and
Statistics). The survey covers ﬁrms that trade more than one million euros and belong to manufacturing
groups holding at least 50% of a foreign aﬃliate’s equity capital.
The data provide trade ﬂows detailed by ﬁrm, product and country of origin or destination. Products
are classiﬁed using the four-digit CPA (Classiﬁcation of Products by Activity) and four-digit harmonized
19. If we introduce speciﬁc investments to be made by the multinational ﬁrm into our framework, we ﬁnd that integration
is always optimal in sectors that are intensive in investment by the parent company, irrespective of the extent of the supplier’s
ﬁnancial constraints. Financial constraints impact on the organizational form only in sectors that are intensive in supplier-
speciﬁc investment.
19system. However, we work at the three-digit level of the CPA classiﬁcation which corresponds precisely to
the NACE Rev1 classiﬁcation (also closer to the ISIC Rev3 three-digit classiﬁcation). The data cover 55%
of total French imports, spread among 4,305 ﬁrms. 20 For our analysis, we focus solely on manufacturing
imports and countries with available data on ﬁnancial development and our main controls (Table 1 provides
the list of countries corresponding to positive imports). We obtain a dataset on 3,957 importing ﬁrms, 52,617
cells by ﬁrm, input and country with positive imports. 21
In addition to total value, the data provide information on the proportion of trade ﬂows with an
independent supplier or aﬃliate ﬁrm for each multinational, country and product. By deﬁnition, the trading
partner is considered to be a subsidiary when the multinational controls at least 50% of the equity capital.
This can be compared to US Census and Customs data, which consider the partner to be a“related party”
when the multinational has 6% of the shares but does not necessarily control the ﬁrm. The data show that
around half of French imports are intra-ﬁrm, which is approximatively the same as the share of intra-ﬁrm
imports in the US. 22
For the purpose of our analysis, a series of indicators by country and industry completes the SESSI
survey. Table 3 provides the mean and standard deviations of the main variables used in our analysis.
Country variables
Our main explanatory variable is the level of ﬁnancial development, measured by the amount of credit
from banks and other ﬁnancial institutions to the private sector as a share of GDP (private credit). This
index reﬂects the ﬁnancial depth of the economy and the capacity to provide external ﬁnancing. The
variable is drawn from Beck et al. (2000). It ranges from 1.3% for Angola to 201% for Japan (see Figure
1). It is highly correlated with alternative measures of ﬁnancial development (stock market capitalization,
accounting standards, interest rate margin, bank regulation, investor protection, etc.). It has been used
extensively as a measure of ﬁnancial development (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; King and Levine, 1993).
Alternatively, we use the net interest margin as an alternative measure of the eﬃciency of the banking
sector (source : Beck et al., 2000). We also use an index of accounting standards (La Porta et al., 1998) as
an example of a measure more directly related to regulations.
We complete our set of country variables with a number of controls. One important control is judi-
cial quality (“rule of law”), reﬂecting the contracting environment. The rule of law index is drawn from
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003). According to Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007), the rule of
law provides a comparative advantage in industries that are more intensive in contracts. As described by
Antras and Helpman (2008), it can also aﬀect the sourcing mode. However, judicial quality is also one
of the determinants of ﬁnancial development, as better enforcement of creditor rights reduces the risk of
default. This point is reﬂected by the strong correlation between both indices (correlation above 0.5).
In addition to the rule of law, we control for intellectual property rights, in particular patent protection
as taken from Ginarte and Park (1997, updated through to 2005). It can aﬀect both sourcing mode and
destination : ﬁrms might be loathe to outsource intermediate goods with high technological content when
20. The survey covers 82% of trade ﬂows involving multinational ﬁrms operating in France.
21. Indices on skill and capital intensity are not available for food and beverages (ISIC 15). Note that our ﬁndings are not
sensitive to the inclusion of this sector when these variables are excluded from the regressions.
22. Note also that the quality of the SESSI survey has been checked by statistical oﬃces using data from other sources.
The trade ﬂows are consistent with customs data and the intra-ﬁrm trade ﬂows consistent with data on the location of the
French aﬃliate (INSEE Financial Links Survey (LIFI), Bank of France and French General Treasury and Economic Policy
Directorate (DGTPE) data).
20IPR are not enforced. In the analysis of sourcing modes, we also use the index of FDI restrictions developed
by the Heritage Foundation for the year 2000. In keeping with traditional theories of trade, we need to
control for physical capital endowments and skilled labor endowments, as drawn from Hall and Jones,
1999 (we obtain similar results using endowments from Antweiler and Treﬂer, 2002). Lastly, we use a
variable constructed by Do and Levchenko (2007), which predicts the level of ﬁnancial development based
on geographical determinants. In particular, the authors show that the external ﬁnance need of exports
(EFNX) predicted by the country’s geographical characteristics (e.g. distance to other countries) has a
strong eﬀect on the level of ﬁnancial development. We use this variable as a control.
Table 1 – List of countries
Countries trading with multinational ﬁrms in France, with available data for private credit and other controls
included in the benchmark regression (column 1 of Table 5) :
Algeria Finland Korea, South Saudi Arabia
Angola Gabon Madagascar Senegal
Argentina Germany Malaysia Sierra Leone
Australia Ghana Malta Singapore
Bangladesh Greece Mauritius South Africa
Benin Guatemala Mexico Spain
Bolivia Guyana Morocco Sri Lanka
Brazil Haiti Mozambique Sweden
Burkina Faso Honduras Netherlands Switzerland
Cameroon Hong Kong New Zealand Syria
Canada Hungary Nicaragua Tanzania
Central African Republic Iceland Niger Thailand
Chad India Nigeria Togo
Chile Indonesia Norway Trinidad and Tobago
Colombia Iran Pakistan Tunisia
Congo Ireland Panama Turkey
Costa Rica Israel Papua New Guinea Uganda
Cyprus Italy Paraguay United Kingdom
Denmark Ivory Coast Peru United States
Ecuador Jamaica Philippines Uruguay
Egypt Japan Poland Venezuela
El Salvador Jordan Portugal Zambia
Fiji Kenya Romania Zimbabwe
Industry variables
Our main measure of product complexity is an index of R&D intensity. Since we focus on French ﬁrms’
oﬀshoring decisions, we measure R&D intensity for the corresponding French industries. The use of R&D
intensity indices on French industries implicitly assumes either that the technology can be transferred to the
supplier (and is thus similar to the technologies in the French industries) or that industry ranking in terms
of technological content varies little from one country to the next. Firm-level data on R&D expenditure are
taken from the 1999 Third Community Innovation Survey (CIS 3). Indices are constructed for each three-
digit NACE industry with at least ten observations. We can use three measures : (i) total industry R&D
expenditure to total sales; (ii) the percentage of ﬁrms in the industry with positive R&D expenditure; (iii)
the 75th percentile of R&D expenditure to sales for ﬁrms in the industry. We focus on the latter because
21it is less sensitive to measurement errors, but we checked that all measures yield similar results. 23 Table
2 provides the list of industries associated with the highest R&D intensities. Not surprisingly, computers,
precision instruments and aircraft correspond to the most complex industries. In opposition, few industries
have a zero index of R&D intensity (e.g. cutting and shaping of stone, manufacture of wooden conteners,
preparation and spinning of textile ﬁbres).
Table 2 – Industries with the highest indices of R&D intensity (France)
NACE Industry classiﬁcation R&D int.
244 Manuf. of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products 5.2%
321 Manuf. of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components 5.8%
323 Manuf. of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus 6.2%
322 Manuf. of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and telegraphy 7.3%
353 Manuf. of aircraft and spacecraft 8.9%
332 Manuf. of instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing and navigating 9.7%
300 Manuf. of oﬃce machinery and computers 10.5%
To make sure that we are not picking up on a French industry particularity generated by speciﬁc
technologies, regulations or limited competition, we use R&D intensity constructed in the same way from
CIS data on ﬁrms in the United Kingdom. The French and English indices are correlated at 57% (the
Spearman rank correlation is 63%).
For our robustness checks, we take the Lall (2000) classiﬁcation of industries. There are ﬁve main
classes : high-tech, medium-tech, low-tech, resource-based and primary goods. We eliminate primary and
resource-based industries from our analysis because they can be strongly driven by natural endowments,
as reported by Lall (2000). Moreover, some resource-based industries may also involve skilled labor and
advanced technologies, which make them hard to compare with low-tech and high-tech industries. The
index is initially constructed using the three-digit SITC Revision 2 classiﬁcation. Given the correspondence
between SITC and NACE industries, the new classiﬁcation clearly diﬀerentiates medium-tech industries
from low-tech industries, but not from the few high-tech industries. We thus use an index that equals one
for high-tech and medium-tech industries and zero for low-tech industries.
Alternatively, we also use the Rauch (1999) classiﬁcation of products. In Rauch (1999), products are
either diﬀerentiated, traded on organized exchanges or reference priced. The latter two categories are often
referred to as homogeneous goods and the former as heterogeneous goods. We thus construct an index
that equals one for diﬀerentiated goods and zero otherwise. 24 This index can be used to some extent to
diﬀerentiate complex from basic products, but it is often interpreted as a measure of contract intensity :
diﬀerentiated products (which are neither traded on organized exchanges nor reference priced) cannot be
easily substituted and are relationship-speciﬁc. Taking this interpretation, Nunn (2007) shows that better
contract enforcement, measured by the rule of law variable, generates a comparative advantage in industries
that rely intensively on diﬀerentiated inputs. As we focus on the comparative advantage in supplying inputs
rather than ﬁnal goods, a notable diﬀerence with Nunn (2007) is that we directly interact the rule of law
variable with the Rauch index using the traded input’s product classiﬁcation. 25
23. The 75th percentile is preferred to the median to reduce the number of zeros (industries where over half the ﬁrms do
not do R&D).
24. As in Nunn (2007), we follow the“liberal”classiﬁcation as opposed to the“conservative”classiﬁcation (see Rauch, 1999).
25. Nunn (2007) focuses on comparative advantage in terms of output. He thus constructs an alternative index equivalent
22Table 3 – Mean and standard deviation of main variables
Variables Mean Std. deviation Obs.
- Aggregate values :
Number of importers 8.288 39.00 6348
Log(1 + Number of importers) 0.684 1.259 6348
Log aggregated imports 7.901 2.728 2021
- Firm-level values :
Log ﬁrm-level imports 4.984 2.196 52617
Share of intra-ﬁrm trade 0.338 0.453 52617
- Across countries :
Private Credit over GDP 0.509 0.467 92
Net interest margin 5.633 4.106 81
Accounting standards 6.078 1.399 37
Predicted demand in external ﬁnance (Pred EFNX) 27.03 0.995 91
Patent Protection 3.128 1.010 92
Rule of law 0.552 0.209 92
Skill endowment 0.621 0.284 92
Capital endowment 9.378 1.535 92
Log GDP per capita 9.377 1.136 89
FDI restrictions 9.377 1.136 89
- Across industries
R&D intensity (France) 0.021 0.023 69
R&D intensity (UK) 0.010 0.013 58
Lall (2000) index 0.615 0.491 52
Rauch (1999) index 0.738 0.344 69
External ﬁnancial dependence 0.237 0.227 69
Skill intensity 4.992 0.153 69
Capital intensity 5.290 0.604 69
Median ﬁrm size 3.989 0.440 69
Headquarter intensity 0.380 0.062 69
Notes :“ a g g r e g a t ev a l u e s ”:b yc o u n t r ya n dp r o d u c t;“ ﬁ r m - l e v e lv a l u e s ”:b yﬁ r m ,c o u n t r ya n dp r o d u c t .
A great deal of attention has been paid to the interaction between ﬁnancial development and dependence
on external ﬁnance since Rajan and Zingales’ (1998) work on ﬁnancial dependence and growth. The index
of ﬁnancial dependence we use is drawn from Klapper, Leaven and Rajan (2007). It is constructed using the
ISIC Revision 3 classiﬁcation from Compustat data on US ﬁrms, in keeping with the Rajan and Zingales
(1998) methodology. Financial dependence is deﬁned as one minus the ratio of cash ﬂow to investment,
taking the average across years for a given ﬁrm (the 1990s) and the median across ﬁrms in the sector.
The same index has been used by Beck (2003) and Manova (2006, 2008) based on the ISIC Revision 2
classiﬁcation.
Skill and physical capital endowments are interacted with indices of skill and capital intensity. Assuming
perfect labor markets and homogeneous ﬁrms, diﬀerences in skill intensities across industries are reﬂected
by diﬀerences in wages. Using the Annual Manufacturing Survey on French ﬁrms (Enquˆ ete Annuelle d’En-
treprises) which covers all ﬁrms with more than 20 employees, we construct our index of skill intensity
as the median (in log) of the distribution of average wages across ﬁrms. 26 Similarly, we use the median
(in log) of the distribution of the capital labor ratio across ﬁrms in the industry as a proxy for capital
to the Rauch (1999) index weighted by the coeﬃcient of the US input-output matrix.
26. The Annual Manufacturing Survey does not provide a skills breakdown.
23intensity. Notice that capital intensity could also be interpreted as a proxy for the size of ﬁxed costs and
headquarter intensity (Antras, 2003).
In addition, we use the Annual Manufacturing Survey to construct two additional indices. For each
industry, we take the median of ﬁrm size in the industry (in log) as well as the median of value added over
sales. The latter is commonly interpreted as an index of vertical integration or headquarter intensity.
3.2 Financial development and the geography of imports
Empirical strategy
The model predicts that, other things being equal, multinational ﬁrms prefer to import complex inputs
from ﬁnancially developed countries (Prediction 1). This points to a diﬀerential eﬀect between complex and
basic goods and naturally calls for a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach (pioneered by Rajan and Zingales,
1998).
In the model, complex goods are deﬁned as goods with a large range of tasks that are ﬁrm-speciﬁc and
cannot be described in a contract. Complexity lies at the heart of the incomplete contracts literature, as
established by the seminal work of Grossman and Hart (1986). 27 In this regard, our preferred measure
is R&D intensity for several reasons. First, R&D is associated with the production of complex products
and processes. This makes codiﬁability and veriﬁability of information a much harder and more expensive
task. Hence, ﬁrms in R&D-intensive sectors are more likely to be unable to describe all speciﬁcations in
contracts. Second, a R&D intensive product is often new and not standardized, which makes it diﬃcult
to specify in advance. A ﬁrm may also be reluctant to do so for strategic reasons. 28 Moreover, one of the
main motives for R&D is to accumulate speciﬁc knowledge helping ﬁrms to create diﬀerentiated products.
Therefore, R&D intensity may also reﬂect product speciﬁcity. Lastly, R&D may not be performed in order
to create new products or processes, but to adapt existing technologies to diﬀerent contexts (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1989). Even in this case, higher R&D intensity reﬂects the diﬃculty to assimilate the technology
and closely relates to eﬀorts in complex tasks in the model.
Other indices of complexity can be used. A second index of technological content is that constructed
from Lall (2000) classiﬁcation, which diﬀerentiates between low-tech versus medium- and high-tech goods.
A third index is drawn from Rauch (1999). It is somewhat diﬀerent and essentially captures product
speciﬁcity in terms of pricing. Non-speciﬁc products are those that can be traded on integrated markets
or referenced. Those which are not referenced are considered to be speciﬁc to one ﬁrm or a small number
of ﬁrms and cannot be priced uniformly. In our empirical analysis, we mainly focus on R&D intensity and
consider these two alternative measures as robustness checks.
Table 4 presents the basic statistics drawn from the data, revealing strong correlations between the
country of origin’s level of ﬁnancial development (private credit) and the number of ﬁrms importing from
this country. The correlation is stronger for R&D-intensive goods, in line with the diﬀerentiated eﬀect
described in the model : over 50% for products with high R&D intensity (above the median) compared
to 38% for other products. Conversely, the correlation between the number of importers and level of
27. The model developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) is based around the key assumption that ”[production decisions]...are
suﬃciently complex that they cannot be speciﬁed completely in an initial contract between the ﬁrms”. In later work, Hart
and Moore (1999) and Segal (1999) develop this idea further by providing theoretical foundation to incomplete contracts,
around the notions of complexity and renegotiation.
28. Speciﬁcation of the characteristics of new product and processes makes them easier to imitate as codiﬁcation facilitates
technological leakage at the innovator’s expense (Caves, 2007).
24complexity is stronger for countries above the ﬁnancial development median than for countries below the
median. Similar diﬀerences in correlation coeﬃcients are observed when looking at aggregated imports
instead of the number of importers. These statistics suggest that ﬁnancial development impacts on the
composition of exports to multinational ﬁrms depending on R&D intensity.
Table 4 – Correlation between import variables and ﬁnancial development (A) or product complexity (B)
Correlation : A) With Financial development B) With R&D intensity
(across countries) (across industries)
Sample : High R&D int. Low R&D int. High ﬁn devt Low ﬁn devt
Log(1 + Nb importers) 0.525 0.384 0.134 0.031
Log(Imports) 0.344 0.176 0.159 -0.024
Share of intra-ﬁrm trade 0.058 0.138 0.105 0.154
Notes :c o r r e l a t i o nb e t w e e ni m p o r tv a r i a b l e s( n u m b e ro fi m p o r t e r s ,i m p o r tb yﬁ r m ,i n t r a - ﬁ r mi m p o r t s )a n de i t h e rp r i v a t e
credit (Panel A) or R&D intensity (Panel B). Samples : “high R&D intensity” : imports of products with R&D intensity
above median; “high ﬁnancial development” : imports from countries with ﬁnancial development above median.
In the following econometric investigation, we analyze the determinants of the number of ﬁrms Ncs that
import inputs from country c in sector s (based on classiﬁcation s of imports). In particular, we want to
test whether the ﬁnancial development of country c has a diﬀerential eﬀect depending on the complexity
of traded good s. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach includes country dummies that control for any
observable or unobservable country characteristics that do not aﬀect the export’s level of complexity. It
also includes product dummies to control for product characteristics that do not aﬀect the origin of the
imports.
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions are not suitable for count data, especially when a signiﬁcant
number of industry/country cells have no importer (two-thirds of our observations). 29 We model the distri-
bution of sourcing choices using the Negative Binomial distribution (NegBin II) described in Cameron and
Trivedi (1998). Negative Binomial diﬀers from the Poisson distribution in that it accounts for overdisper-
sion of the residual and often provides a better ﬁt (it encompasses the Poisson distribution as a particular
case). Moreover, we can test and check that specifying a Poisson distribution is not appropriate.
We assume that ﬁrms’ choices depend on a set of variables Xcs. These variables include a set ˜ Xcs of
observed industry and country characteristics, but we also allow for unobserved determinants. Speciﬁcally,
we suppose that the probability that a ﬁrm imports a product s from country c is an exponential function of
country ﬁxed eﬀects, industry ﬁxed eﬀects, an interaction term between ﬁnancial development and input
complexity, a set of controls and the unobserved eﬀect. Taking the aggregate number of importers by
country and product, it follows that :
E[Ncs|Xcs]=e x p[ β.(FinDevtc ∗ Complexitys)+γ.Controlscs + ηc + ζs + λcs] (10)
where FinDevtc is the level of ﬁnancial development of country c, Complexitys the level of complexity of
product s, ηc a country ﬁxed eﬀect, ζs an industry ﬁxed eﬀect and λcs an unobserved eﬀect.
Conditionally on the mean E[Ncs|Xcs], the number of importers follows a Poisson distribution. The
Poisson distribution can be justiﬁed by taking the limit of a Bernouilli law for a large number of ﬁrms.
However, conditionally on the set of observed characteristics ˜ Xcs, the distribution deviates from the Poisson
29. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) ﬁnd OLS inconsistency may also apply to traditional gravity equations.
25distribution because of the unobserved component λcs. Assuming that this term is an i.i.d. random eﬀect
following a gamma distribution with coeﬃcient 1/α (with variance α), it can be shown that the number
of importers follows a Negative Binomial distribution (see Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) with law :





where µ = E[Ncs| ˜ Xcs]. Moreover, the conditional variance is given by Va r[Ncs| ˜ Xcs]=µ(1 + αµ). When
the random eﬀect λ has zero variance (α = 0), the variance of Ncs equals the (conditional) mean and the
distribution is Poisson. When α is strictly positive, the distribution is said to be overdispersed.
Equation (10) is estimated under Maximum Likelihood (see Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). This can also
be used to estimate α, assuming that it does not depend on the expected mean µ (NegBin II speciﬁcation).
As in OLS regressions, the identiﬁcation of our main coeﬃcient relies on the assumption of orthogonality
between the interaction term and the residual Ncs − E[ ˆ Ncs| ˜ Xcs]. However, given the inclusion of the full
set of country and industry dummies, this estimation strategy is not sensitive to the exclusion of controls
that are not correlated with ﬁnancial development or do not aﬀect trade diﬀerently depending on the
complexity of inputs. Therefore, we are mainly concerned with variables potentially correlated with ﬁnancial
development and that may impact on complex goods industries in particular.
In all the tables, we report robust standard errors corrected for clusters by country because our main
variable FinDevtc only varies across countries. The coeﬃcients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities, as
they measure the impact of the right-hand-side variable on the log of the (expected) number of importers. 30
Results on the number of importers
In Table 5, we analyze the interaction term between complexity and ﬁnancial development for diﬀerent
measures of complexity, including our main controls. In column (1), ﬁnancial development is interacted
with our benchmark index of complexity : R&D intensity measured for French industries. This yields a
positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, a result in line with Prediction 1 : ﬁnancial development is a source of
comparative advantage in the supply of complex inputs.
Our control variables include capital and skill endowments interacted with capital and skill intensity.
They enter positively and signiﬁcantly, in keeping with the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade. Two other
important controls, rule of law and patent protection, are positively correlated with ﬁnancial develop-
ment and may potentially aﬀect sourcing strategies. In line with the recent literature on institutions and
trade (Nunn, 2007; Levchenko, 2007; Acemoglu, Antras and Helpman, 2007), judicial quality and better
contract enforcement generate a comparative advantage in complex industries that rely more intensively
on contracts. In our regression, rule of law is interacted with the Rauch (1999) index of diﬀerentiated
goods versus homogeneous goods, often interpreted as an index of contract intensity. We ﬁnd a positive
interaction term, which conﬁrms the results obtained by Nunn (2007). Patent protection, our proxy for
intellectual property rights, is interacted with the index of R&D intensity, as R&D-intensive industries rely
more intensively on patents. However, we do not ﬁnd that stronger intellectual property rights favor trade
in R&D-intensive inputs.
30. The interaction term should be interpreted as a cross derivative of the logarithm of the predicted number of importers,
which is linear in the right-hand-side variables. Note also that our ﬁxed eﬀects subsume all direct eﬀects of country- and
industry-level variables, and thus we do not need to control for direct eﬀects.
26Potential problems may aﬀect our main measure of R&D intensity. Given that it is computed from data
on French industries, it may capture some particularities among the French ﬁrms in these industries, which
could also impact on trade. For example, the distribution of ﬁrm size, imperfect competition and speciﬁc
regulations may simultaneously aﬀect R&D investment and sourcing strategies. To avoid these potential
biases, we use an index of R&D intensity measured from similar data on ﬁrms in the UK. In column (2), we
obtain a strong positive coeﬃcient with the UK index. The coeﬃcient is higher, but once it is normalized
by the respective standard deviation (see Table 3), the amplitude of the latter estimation is slightly lower
compared to column (1).
Our result is also robust to the alternative measures of complexity. In column (3), ﬁnancial development
is interacted with the Lall (2000) index of high-/medium-tech inputs versus low-tech inputs. We ﬁnd a
positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, showing that countries with a higher level of ﬁnancial development are
more likely to supply multinational ﬁrms with high- and medium-tech inputs. In this case, the index of
patent protection is also interacted with the Lall index and yields a stronger coeﬃcient compared to the
other columns. In column (4), we use the Rauch (1999) index of diﬀerentiated goods versus homogeneous
goods (contract intensity), which also yields a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the interaction term.
Interestingly, the rule of law coeﬃcient becomes insigniﬁcant, suggesting that ﬁnancial development has
the strongest impact. 31
Beck (2003) and Manova (2006 and 2008) use world trade data by country and sector to show that
ﬁnancial development generates a comparative advantage in sectors that are more dependent on external
ﬁnance. These studies use the measure of ﬁnancial dependence developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998),
constructed as the share of investment not ﬁnanced by cash ﬂows, taking the median across US listed ﬁrms
in the sectors. Our model, however, suggests that the dependence of multinationals’ suppliers on external
ﬁnance is speciﬁcally related to contract incompleteness and increases with their production complexity.
As both indices of ﬁnancial dependence and technological complexity are positively correlated (at 20%),
we need to check that our results are not driven by the Rajan and Zingales (1998) index of ﬁnancial
dependence. In column (5), we therefore control for the interaction term between ﬁnancial development
and ﬁnancial dependence. We also control for any interactions between ﬁnancial development and capital
intensity and ﬁrm size (in the corresponding sector in France). Both indices may depend on the size of ﬁxed
costs and be positively correlated with the index of R&D intensity (larger ﬁrms are more likely to invest
in R&D). Alternatively, capital intensity may be interpreted as an index of headquarter intensity (Antras,
2003). Another index of headquarter intensity (value added over sales across industries) is also included
into the regression. In line with our model, only the interaction term between ﬁnancial development and
complexity is positive and signiﬁcant while the other interaction terms taking in ﬁnancial development are
not statistically signiﬁcant. Qualitatively, the same results are obtained using the Lall (2000) and Rauch
(1999) indices instead of R&D intensity.
In Table 6, we perform further robustness checks. In column (1), we drop the controls for rule of law and
intellectual property rights, and compare the coeﬃcient to column (1) of Table 5. Although both variables
are positively correlated with ﬁnancial development, we check that their inclusion or exclusion does not
alter the coeﬃcient for ﬁnancial development.
In columns (2), we check that our results are robust to the inclusion of other controls. In particular, we
might still be concerned with whether ﬁnancial development captures the eﬀect of an alternative country
31. This result, however, needs to be interpreted with caution as the correlation between both indices of ﬁnancial develop-
ment and rule of law is over 50%.
27Table 5 – Imports, product complexity and ﬁnancial development
Dependent variable : Number of importers, with E[N] = exp(bX)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)





(Fin devt) * (Lall index) 0.357
[0.150]
∗∗
(Fin devt) * (Rauch index) 0.682
[0.326]
∗∗
(Fin devt) * (Ext ﬁn dep) -0.337
[0.251]
(Fin devt) * (Capital intensity) -0.330
[0.184]
∗
(Fin devt) * (Firm size) -0.110
[0.121]
(Fin devt) * (HQ intensity) 0.985
[0.733]
(Patent prot) * (Lall index) 0.301
[0.101]
∗∗∗
(Patent prot) * (R&D intensity) -0.228 -2.859 1.677 -0.203
[2.004] [4.408] [1.979] [1.986]
(Rule of law) * (Rauch index) 2.121 1.863 0.836 1.074 1.794
[0.609]
∗∗∗ [0.580]
∗∗∗ [0.515] [0.914] [0.620]
∗∗∗














α 0.532 0.549 0.455 0.542 0.516
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Product dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Measure of R&D intensity France UK France France France
Observations 6348 5336 5704 6348 6348
Log pseudo-likelihood -7447 -6669 -6251 -7454 -7431
Notes :d e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l e:n u m b e ro fm u l t i n a t i o n a l sw i t hp o s i t i v ei m p o r t s ,b yc o u n t r ya n dp r o d u c t .N e g a t i v eb i n o m i a l
regressions. Main regressors : interactions between country variables and product characteristics. “Fin devt” : private credit
over GDP ; “R&D intensity” : measured either in UK (column 2) or France (other columns) ; “Lall index” : equal to one for
high- and medium-tech products, zero for low-tech produts (Lall, 2000); “Rauch index” : equal to one for goods that are not
traded on integrated market or reference priced (Rauch, 1999); “Ext ﬁn dep” : dependence in external ﬁnance (Rajan and
Zingales, 1998); “Firm size” : median ﬁrm size in the corresponding French industry; “HQ intensity” : headquarter intensity;
“Patent prot”: patent protection. α :s e ee q u a t i o n( 1 0 )i nt h et e x t .F i x e de ﬀ e c t sb yc o u n t r ya n db yp r o d u c t .R o b u s ts t a n d a r d
errors into brackets, corrected for clusters by country; ∗ signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
characteristic with a diﬀerent impact on complex and basic products. We thus interact rule of law with
R&D intensity in the place of the Rauch index. The new interaction term with rule of law is not signiﬁcant.
It conﬁrms that rule of law yields the strongest eﬀect under the Rauch (1999) measure of contract intensity.
We control for the interaction of capital and skill endowments with the index of R&D intensity in addition
to the interaction with capital and skill intensity, but the corresponding coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant. We
can also include an interaction between R&D intensity and per capital GDP (in log). Although ﬁnancial
development is positively correlated with income level, the new interaction term is not signiﬁcant and the
coeﬃcient for ﬁnancial development remains unchanged. Thus, our results are not generated by the level
28of overall development rather than ﬁnancial development. 32
In columns (3) and (4), we check that our results are robust to alternative measures of ﬁnancial de-
velopment. We use a measure of the net interest rate margin in column (3) and an index of accounting
standards in column (4). The former provides an alternative measure of the (in)eﬃciency of the banking
sector while the latter directly reﬂects ﬁnancial regulations. The results indicate strong interaction terms
between complexity and both indicators, with the expected signs.
Although our data are particularly rich from many points of view, the cross-sectional nature of this
study may raise concerns about the direction of causality. It could be argued that exporting opportunities
for local ﬁrms in sectors dependent on external ﬁnance increase the demand for credit and hence foster
the development of the ﬁnancial sector. Do and Levchenko (2007) rationalize this mechanism. They build
a simple model to show that greater foreign demand in ﬁnancially dependent industries leads to larger
volumes of credit and more developed ﬁnancial markets. Based on the estimated eﬀect of geographic
variables on trade volumes across sectors, they construct a country-level variable (“predicted EFNX”) that
predicts the value of external ﬁnance need of exports. They report a substantial correlation between this
variable and ﬁnancial development. In column (5), we interact this variable with R&D intensity. We ﬁnd
that the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant, irrespective of whether the interaction between private credit and
R&D intensity is included or not. This suggests that our results are not driven by observed geographical
determinants of foreign demand.
Another argument that can be advanced is that countries with technological advantages in sectors
that rely relatively more on external ﬁnance will tend to develop their ﬁnancial systems to exploit these
advantages. Our work, however, focus on multinationals’ suppliers. There is extensive evidence that these
ﬁrms beneﬁt from technology transfers by multinationals (Caves, 2007) and operate diﬀerent technologies
from local ﬁrms. 33 Hence, omitting controls on the local technology is unlikely to bias our results. Arguably,
the costs of technology transfers can vary across countries depending on the extent of their absorptive
capacity but we account for this in our regressions by controlling for human capital interacted with R&D
intensity (see column 2).
With cross-sectional data, one way to check the direction of causality is to use an instrument for ﬁnancial
development which does not directly impact on exports. Legal origin provides an exogenous variable that
meets these requirements. In particular, common-law countries are better ﬁnancially developed than civil-
law countries. Nevertheless, it has also been shown to have a strong eﬀect on various other aspects of
institutional quality (Djankov, MacLiesh and Shleifer, 2007; La Porta et al. 2008). Nunn (2007) proposes
a simple way to isolate the eﬀect on ﬁnancial development by matching civil and common law countries
32. Moreover, we should note that the inclusion of R&D intensity index interactions with distance, language and colonial
links does not aﬀect our main result (not reported).
33. In Carluccio and Fally (2008) we analyze the eﬀects of technological incompatibilities between foreign and domestic




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.with similar characteristics in control variables. In unreported estimations, we apply a similar method and
ﬁnd a strong and positive eﬀect of common law on the composition of exports in complex products, after
matching countries by rule of law, level of intellectual property rights protection and factor endowments
(results available upon request).
In all regressions specifying a Negative Binomial distribution for the residual, the estimated coeﬃcient
α is approximately 0.5. The estimated standard error is 0.08 and the likelihood-ratio test for α =0
(corresponding to the Poisson distribution) is rejected. 34 It shows that the residual’s variance is strictly
larger than the mean, which implies that the residual does not follow a Poisson distribution (overdispersion).
In columns (6) and (7), we check alternative speciﬁcations to verify that our results do not depend on
our assumptions regarding the error term distribution. In column (6), we estimate a Poisson regression
with quasi-maximum likelihood (QMLE). Gourieroux, Monfort and Trognon (1984) show that Poisson
estimations are consistent under misspeciﬁcations of the error structure. Our estimated coeﬃcients are
very similar, with the main interaction term being slightly higher. The only diﬀerence concerns the rule
of law coeﬃcient, which is no longer signiﬁcant. However, note that the log-likelihood is much lower for
the Poisson speciﬁcation compared to the Negative Binomial – it illustrates the better ﬁt obtained with
the former. In column (7), we run a simple OLS regression but, in order to accommodate for zeros, the
dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus the number of importers. We obtain similar coeﬃcients
for the interaction terms between ﬁnancial development and complexity. However, several controls yield
diﬀerent coeﬃcients : patent protection now enters positively and signiﬁcantly, whereas the estimated
impact of rule of law is less signiﬁcant compared to negative binomial speciﬁcations.
We perform additional robustness checks in Appendix B. In particular, we test whether our results are
sensible to the identiﬁcation of intermediate goods, as opposed to goods that are not further processed by
the importer. Moreover, we test whether our results are not driven by the presence of export platforms by
restricting to groups with headquarters in France.
Finally, we have checked that our results are not sensitive to minor industry or country sample changes.
For example, the coeﬃcient remains equally similar when we drop countries with less than one million
inhabitants, African countries, OECD countries or Asian tigers. Neither is the coeﬃcient sensitive to
dropping private credit or R&D intensity percentiles either end of the scale.
All of these results conﬁrm that the country of origin’s ﬁnancial development is strongly correlated with
the number of multinational ﬁrms importing complex inputs compared to basic inputs.
But how sizeable is the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on the number of multinational ﬁrms importing
complex inputs? In view of our estimation approach, we consider the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development by
comparing two industries that diﬀer in one standard deviation in terms of R&D intensity. Using the co-
eﬃcient of the interaction term, we estimate the diﬀerential eﬀect of a one standard deviation change in
ﬁnancial development. Given the coeﬃcient in column (1) of Table 5, we obtain a diﬀerential eﬀect of 9%
on the number of importers. This eﬀect is large and is comparable to the eﬀect of skill endowment on the
number of importers (diﬀerential eﬀect of 18% by comparing low- and high-skill-intensive industries). Mo-
reover, the estimated eﬀect of ﬁnancial development is stable across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations in columns
(2) through (4) of Table 5 (10% with the Rauch index, 8% with the Lall index and 8% with R&D intensity
calculated from the UK data). By comparison, the rule of law eﬀect is larger if we take the column (1)
estimation, but smaller taking column (3) in Table 5.
34. This test does not account for heteroskedasticity, but the P-value is lower than 0.001.
313.3 Financial development and the scale of imports
So far, we have tested Prediction 1 by looking at the impact of ﬁnancial development and input com-
plexity on the number of multinational ﬁrms by country and industry with positive imports. In Table 7, we
examine whether the ﬁnancial development eﬀect is also observed using the aggregate value of imports by
sector and country as well as ﬁrm-level imports. Yet the total value of imports by product and country of
origin could well capture various trade characteristic aspects. Firstly, the value depends on the number of
multinationals importing. However, we can eliminate this eﬀect by taking ﬁrm-level imports and analyzing
within-ﬁrm variations. As we do not observe trade ﬂows for each supplier, the value depends on the number
of suppliers. It also depends on the scale of production that is oﬀshored. Lastly, it is aﬀected by the unit
value of the traded goods as we do not have trade ﬂows in quantities.
As ﬁrm-level data on trade is often not available, most studies perform regressions on the log of aggregate
trade ﬂows (Anderson and Wincoop, 2004). For the ﬁrst two columns of Table 7, we ﬁrst specify the
following equation for aggregate imports Mcs by product s and country c :
Log(Mcs)=β.(FinDevtc ∗ Complexitys)+γ.Controlscs + ηc + ζs + εcs (11)
Note that observations of zero trade ﬂows are naturally excluded from this regression – taking zeros into
account by estimating Poisson or Negative Binomial regressions (as in Silva Santos and Teryeno, 2006)
provides results close to our estimations of the number of importers.
We also use our ﬁrm-level data to test whether ﬁnancial development has a diﬀerential impact on
ﬁrm-level imports of complex products. To some extent, eﬀects on ﬁrm-level trade ﬂows correspond to the
intensive margin of imports. Speciﬁcally, we can estimate :
Log(Mcsi)=β.(FinDevtc ∗ Complexitys)+γ.Controlscs + ηc + ζs + φi + εcsi (12)
where φi is a ﬁxed eﬀect by ﬁrm. This is estimated for all observations by ﬁrm, country and product with
positive trade ﬂows. Speciﬁcations (11) and (12) are estimated by a simple OLS. As ﬁnancial development
only varies by country, we report robust standard errors corrected for clusters by country.
Table 7 presents our ﬁndings on import value. In columns (1) and (2), we observe that ﬁnancial
constraints interacted with the R&D intensity index have a strong eﬀect on the aggregate value of im-
ports, controlling for factor endowments. The coeﬃcient is not sensitive to the inclusion of other controls
(column 2). Qualitatively, the results in column (2) are in line with the results in column (1) of Table 5 :
rule of law has a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, but not intellectual property rights. Again, these results are robust
to the interaction of ﬁnancial development with the three alternative indices (not reported).
In columns (3) through (7), the dependent variable is the value of imports at ﬁrm level. There is no ﬁrm
dummy in column (3), but ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects are systematically included in columns (4) to (7). The results
ﬁnd that ﬁnancial development has a signiﬁcant impact on ﬁrm-level imports. A comparison of columns
(3) and (4) shows that controlling for ﬁrm dummies does not aﬀect the ﬁnancial development coeﬃcient.
Interestingly, the impact of ﬁnancial development on ﬁrm-level exports roughly corresponds to the
diﬀerence between the estimated impact on aggregate imports (column 1) and the estimated impact on
the number of importers (column 1 of Table 5), which is consistent with the simple equality between total

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.We perform the same robustness checks as for the previous tables. In column (5), we check that our
ﬁnancial development ﬁndings are not driven by the interaction with external ﬁnance dependence, capital
intensity, ﬁrm size or headquarter intensity measured in the corresponding sector in France. Although the
interactions with capital intensity and ﬁrm size are marginally signiﬁcant, the main coeﬃcient remains
unchanged. In column (6), we interact rule of law with the R&D intensity index in the place of the Rauch
index of contract intensity : the coeﬃcient for rule of law becomes insigniﬁcant whereas the coeﬃcient for
credit remains. Moreover, our results are robust to controlling for the interaction term between per capita
GDP and R&D intensity. 35 Finally, in column (7) we control for R&D intensity interacted with Do and
Levchenko (2007) variable EFNX (prediction of ﬁnancial development based on geographic characteristics).
The coeﬃcient is now signiﬁcant at 5% but our interaction is not aﬀected.
The Table 7 results show that the impact of ﬁnancial development on the import of complex inputs
carries over diﬀerent speciﬁcations and diﬀerent margins. It aﬀects not only the number of importers, but
also total imports and ﬁrm-level imports. Quantitatively, ﬁnancial development has less of an eﬀect on ﬁrm-
level imports (column 4 of Table 7) than on the number of importers (column 1 of Table 5). Consistently,
the sum of these eﬀects equals the eﬀect on total imports (column 2 of Table 7).
3.4 Financial development and sourcing mode
We now investigate the model’s theoretical predictions with regards to the relation between ﬁnancial
constraints and optimal organizational mode. Our theory predicts that integration is preferred to trade
with independent suppliers when ﬁnancial constraints are strong and trade involves complex products with
inputs requiring a larger proportion of speciﬁc, non-contractible investments (Prediction 2). To provide
evidence of this statement, the following econometric analysis uses as its dependent variable the share of
intra-ﬁrm imports by ﬁrm for each product-country pair. 36
Table 4 presents some descriptive statistics. It shows that the correlation between our measure of
ﬁnancial development and the share of intra-ﬁrm imports is substantially stronger in the case of complex
goods (Panel A). Conversely, the correlation between the average share of intra-ﬁrm imports and R&D
intensity is stronger in countries with low ﬁnancial development. However, these correlations might be
driven by the eﬀects of variables other than ﬁnancial development, such the general level of contract
enforcement. So the above simple correlations, although informative, could be misleading. 37
In order to overcome this problem, we take a similar approach to the previous section and focus our
analysis on interaction terms. In this case, we also look at variations in ﬁnancial development across
countries and variations in complexity across industries. As already mentioned, this strategy is appealing
because it has the advantage of controlling for all industry- and country-speciﬁc characteristics that we do
not observe and that might aﬀect intra-ﬁrm shares. In order to be sure that we are picking up the eﬀect
of ﬁnancial development, we control for several alternative interaction terms.
The empirical strategy we employ is in line with the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach taken in the
35. In addition, we can control for interaction terms of skill and capital endowments with R&D intensity but it does not
aﬀect our results.
36. Our data is disaggregated at product level, so we are unable to observe the value and sourcing mode governing the
relationship with each particular supplier. Our product-level data consequently contains“mixed”trade ﬂows, where the same
product has been imported by the same ﬁrm by means of both intra-ﬁrm trade and outsourcing.
37. Acemoglu et al.( forthcoming)s h o wt h a ts i m p l ec r o s s - c o u n t r yc o m p a r i s o n sm a yb ed r i v e nb yi n d u s t r yc o m p o s i t i o n .
Once industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in their regressions, the direct eﬀects of institutional quality on the organizational
mode are generally not signiﬁcant.
34previous section. More speciﬁcally, our estimating equation is given by :
Icsi = β.(FinDevtc ∗ Complexitys)+γ.Controlscs + αi + ηc + ζs + εcsi (13)
where FinDevtc is the ﬁnancial development variable for country c, Complexitys is the complexity index
for traded input s, and αi, ηc and ζs are ﬁxed eﬀects by ﬁrm, country and industry respectively. Thus, our
identiﬁcation strategy focuses on within-ﬁrm variations in sourcing modes across industry-country cells. We
estimate the above equation using Ordinarily Least Squares (OLS) and report robust standard errors with
correction for clusters by country. One potential problem with estimating (15) by OLS is that our dependent
variable is deﬁned as a share and is therefore bounded between zero and one. To account for this, we can
estimate the model under a fractional Logit speciﬁcation and obtain very similar results (available upon
request). As a robustness check, we also provide results from the estimation of a conditional Logit model
using only “pure” organizational strategies (i.e. when the share of intra-ﬁrm trade in an industry-country
cell is either 100% or zero). Note, however, that such an approach potentially loses valuable information,
as around 13% of our observations are mixed.
Results are presented in Table 8. The coeﬃcient of main interest is, as before, the interaction between
ﬁnancial development and complexity. As can be seen from column (1), the coeﬃcient is negative and
signiﬁcant. This result is robust to the inclusion a full set of country, industry and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, which
are included in all regressions presented in this section.
Note that we obtain very similar coeﬃcients for ﬁnancial development whether ﬁrm dummies are inclu-
ded or not. It implies that the eﬀects we are picking up are not due to any unobserved ﬁrm characteristics
that may impact systematically on the choice between intra-ﬁrm and arm’s length trade – for example,
Antras and Helpman (2004 and 2008) predict that more productive ﬁrms tend to trade relatively more
within the ﬁrm than less productive ﬁrms. 38
In addition, as can be seen from the table, all the regressions include the following set of controls.
First, the index of patent protection is interacted with R&D intensity. Multinational ﬁrms may prefer to
source complex inputs from an aﬃliate in order to reduce technological imitation and appropriation by
local competitors, and these forces might be stronger in environments where intellectual property rights
are weakly enforced. This coeﬃcient is only signiﬁcant in the case where complexity is used using the UK
data, and does not aﬀect the sign and signiﬁcance of our main coeﬃcient. Secondly, we control for judicial
quality, interacted with the Rauch index. Foreign ﬁrms’ internalization decisions may be aﬀected by the
quality of judicial system; rule-of-law eﬀects could arguably be greater in contract-dependent industries.
This coeﬃcient is positive in all speciﬁcations, consistent with the ﬁndings of Defever and Toubal (2008)
for French ﬁrms. In addition, its inclusion does not aﬀect the relevance of the ﬁnancial development
variable. Lastly, all of our regressions include controls for traditional comparative advantage determinants,
interacting capital intensity and skill intensity at industry level with capital and skill endowments at
country level respectively. Note that we have chosen to report results from regressions including all of these
controls together in order to limit the number of columns. Yet our results remain the same when we add
one control at a time, and are similar when we exclude ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. 39
38. Defever and Toubal (2008) and Corcos et al. (2008) test this prediction using the same dataset.
39. In unreported estimates, we also control for the interaction between per capita GDP and complexity to check whether
we are indeed picking up the level of overall development rather than a ﬁnancial channel. This interaction term comes out















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.We perform various robustness checks to ensure that it is really the interaction of ﬁnancial development
and R&D intensity that drives the intra-ﬁrm share eﬀects on which we report. In column (2), we use R&D
intensity calculated for three-digit UK industries as a measure of product complexity. The sign of the
interaction between this variable and ﬁnancial development is negative, signiﬁcant and greater than that
in column (2). However, the magnitude of the eﬀects of both measures is similar if we normalize the
coeﬃcient by the respective standard deviation. In columns (3) and (4), we again use the Lall and Rauch
indices and obtain signiﬁcant coeﬃcients with the expected signs. These results indicate that trade is more
likely to occur with an aﬃliate when ﬁnancial development is low and the level of complexity is high, as
predicted by the theoretical analysis.
It might be argued that if complex industries are more dependent on external ﬁnance, then our results
might be picking up the eﬀect of external ﬁnance dependence instead of complexity. In column (5), the
inclusion of the interaction between ﬁnancial development and the external ﬁnance index conﬁrms that
this is not the case. In the same column, we include interaction between ﬁnancial development and two
alternative measures of ﬁxed costs constructed at industry level : capital intensity and ﬁrm size. These
controls are included to ensure that R&D intensity reﬂects technological complexity and not the size of
the industry’s ﬁxed costs. None of these controls turns out to be signiﬁcant.
In column (6), we address other important questions by including four additional controls. We ﬁrst
include an interaction between the rule-of-law measure and R&D intensity. This coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant,
while the interaction between ﬁnancial development and R&D intensity remains negative and signiﬁcant.
Therefore, our results on the impact of ﬁnancial development on the share of intra-ﬁrm trade are not
driven by the overall level of contract enforcement. Secondly, we interact rule of law with capital intensity
at industry level. The coeﬃcient is negative, but not statistically diﬀerent from zero; note that its sign
is in line with the prediction by Antras and Helpman (2008) and the empirical results of Bernard et al.
(2008). Thirdly, as in tables 6 and 7, we control for the interaction between R&D intensity and EFNX
(which predicts the level of ﬁnancial development based on geographic characteristics). Fourthly, we may
be concerned with whether ﬁnancial development, measured by private credit to GDP, is endogenous to
the intensity of foreign direct investment in the country. However, we show that the inclusion of a measure
of restrictions on foreign investors does not alter our result. Note that we obtain a similar result when
controlling directly for FDI inﬂows.
Finally, column (7) presents the results of the conditional Logit estimation, including ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
and other controls, from which mixed strategies are dropped (the dependent variable is thus either equal
to zero or unity). Again, the sign and level of signiﬁcance of our coeﬃcient of interest are in line with
Prediction 2.
We also perform robustness checks on the estimating sample. We run the above regressions minus Asian,
African and small countries (less than one million inhabitants) and obtain the same results. Our results are
robust to the elimination of one country at a time (obtaining even stronger results when we drop Japan and
the USA, which have the highest ratios of private credit to GDP). In Appendix B, we examine narrower
deﬁnitions of intermediate imports and restrict our sample to groups with headquarters in France. We ﬁnd
similar and even stronger results.
374 Conclusion
In recent years, international trade literature has devoted substantial eﬀorts to understand the role of
institutions in shaping trade patterns. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism driven by an interaction
between ﬁnancial development and the extent of contract incompleteness. We argue that suppliers’ ﬁnancial
constraints exacerbate the hold-up problem and impact on multinational ﬁrms’ optimal sourcing strategies.
These eﬀects are stronger in complex industries characterized by higher degrees of contract incompleteness.
Further, the model shows that vertical integration alleviates ﬁnancial constraints, albeit at the cost of lower
eﬀorts and productivity.
The model generates two novel predictions. First, we predict that ﬁnancial development creates a
comparative advantage in the supply of complex products. Second, we should observe higher shares of
intra-ﬁrm trade in complex products from countries with a low level of ﬁnancial development. These
predictions are tested using detailed ﬁrm-level data on the international operations of multinational ﬁrms
located in France. We use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach, which allows for the inclusion of country
and product ﬁxed eﬀects. A one standard deviation increase in the level of ﬁnancial development yields an
increase of 9% in the number of multinational ﬁrms importing complex goods compared to basic goods, an
increase of 7% in the volume of ﬁrm-level imports and a decrease of 3% in the share of intra-ﬁrm trade. 40
These results are robust to diﬀerent measures of the complexity and speciﬁcity of the traded goods, to
alternative measures of the level of ﬁnancial development and to the inclusion of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects among
other controls. The estimated eﬀect of ﬁnancial development appears to be as large as that of contract
enforcement.
As pointed up by the model, the positive eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on international trade is not
limited to isolated exporters but carries over into multinationals’ suppliers. Multinational ﬁrms are known
to play an important role in the transfer of technologies to suppliers located in less developed countries,
where the adoption of technologies constitutes a major source of productivity growth. One implication of
our model is that suppliers located in countries with poor ﬁnancial institutions are less likely to acquire
new technological knowledge to produce complex products. This mechanism may explain, for example,
why the presence of multinational ﬁrms has a stronger impact on growth in countries with better ﬁnancial
institutions (Alfaro et al, 2004).
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Appendix A : Theoretical appendix on extensions
Constrained investments
In this extension, we ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial constraint (FC) starts to be binding when initial capital W




2 aθ(2c)1−σ(1 + α)σ
This threshold W
o
veriﬁes the same properties as in Proposition 1 : it is decreasing in κ, especially when
θ is large.
When only the ﬁnancial constraint (FC) is binding, proﬁts under outsourcing equal :











41However, both the ﬁnancial constraint (FC) and the participation constraint (PC) my be binding for











Both expressions yield results that conﬁrm Proposition 2 : the multinational’s proﬁts increase in κ,e s p e -
cially for high θ.
There are also two cases for the organizational threshold. At the point where the multinational is
indiﬀerent between outsourcing and integration, we can show that the ﬁnancial constraint (FC) is binding
under outsourcing and the ﬁnancial constraint (FC) is not binding under integration.
However, the participation constraint may also be binding at this point under outsourcing. If this is
the case, we obtain the following organizational threshold :
W
I/O
= aθ(1−κ)( 2 c)1−σ δσ( 1+α
2 )











Both thresholds are decreasing in κ, especially for high θ, and verify Proposition 3.
Contingent debt repayment and bargaining
In this extension of the model, we ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial constraint (FC) starts to be binding when






This threshold is decreasing in κ, especially for high θ, which conﬁrms Proposition 1.
When the ﬁnancial constraint is binding, we ﬁnd that the multinational’s total proﬁts equal :




2 )(2c)1−σ + a(1−θ)(1−ρ)c1−σ
which is increasing in κ, especially for high θ, which conﬁrms Proposition 2.
The organizational threshold W
I/O











which is decreasing in κ, especially for high θ, and veriﬁes Proposition 3.
A general production function
In this extension, total revenues are given by a general function Y (e,q) that depends on non contractible
eﬀorts e and contractible eﬀorts q. Costs are linear in both types of eﬀorts : C = ce.e + cq.q. As in the
baseline model, outside options of the multinational ﬁrm under outsourcing correspond to revenues Y (0,q)
when non-contractible tasks equal zero, while the supplier’s outside option is nil.





. Investments in complex tasks are
chosen by the supplier in order to maximize its ex post revenues minus the costs. Under outsourcing, we




2Y (e,q) − ce.e
￿
41. With the symmetric Nash bargaining solution and zero outside option for the supplier, investments are not constrained
in liquidity by the multinational, as in the baseline model.
42When investments in complex and basic tasks are strong complements ( ∂
2Y
∂e∂q > 0), we ﬁnd investments in
complex tasks are increasing in investments in basic tasks.
Investments in contractible tasks are determined ex ante by the multinational ﬁrm, by anticipating
the supplier’s investments e = e∗(q). When the ﬁnancial constraint is slack, the participation constraint
is binding and total proﬁts of the multinational equal the entire surplus. In this case, the multinational
chooses q to maximize
Π=Y (e,q) − ce.e − cq.q
In the opposite case where the initial capital of the supplier is zero (W = 0), only the ﬁnancial constraint
is binding and the multinational’s total proﬁts are the sum of ex post revenues plus the debt that can be








2Y (e,q) − 1
2Y (0,q)
￿
− ce.e − cq.q
where e = e∗(q). The optimal choice in contractible investments is a function q∗(κ) of the level ﬁnancial
development κ where q∗(1) corresponds to the optimal choice when the ﬁnancial constraint is not binding.
When investments in complex and basic tasks are strong complements ( ∂
2Y
∂e∂q > 0), we ﬁnd investments in
basic tasks are increasing in investments in ﬁnancial development.
By applying the envelop theorem, the total derivative of the multinational’s proﬁts according to κ equals
the partial derivative of the above expression taken at optimal choices. We ﬁnd the expression described






Y (e,q) − Y (0,q)
￿
> 0
Concerning the choice between outsourcing and integration, we can obtain a similar result if we assume
that only the participation constraint is binding under integration and only the ﬁnancial constraint is
binding under outsourcing at the point where the multinational is indiﬀerent. On the one hand, when only
the ﬁnancial constraint is binding under outsourcing, the multinational’s proﬁts are linear in the initial
capital of the supplier. On the other hand, the multinational’s proﬁts under integration do not depend
on ﬁnancial development when the ﬁnancial constraint is not binding. Therefore, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect







Y (e,q) − Y (0,q)
￿
< 0
Appendix B : Robustness checks on the identiﬁcation of vertical trade and
supply chains
In this appendix we present results from robustness checks regarding the identiﬁcation of vertical supply
chains. Following the methodology adopted by Feenstra and Hanson (1996), we drop imports of goods that
are classiﬁed in the same category as the main product of the importing business unit within the group (and
thus we drop business units of manufacturing groups that are not primarily classiﬁed as manufacturing).
As can be seen in the odd columns of Table 9, we observe that our main coeﬃcient remains unchanged
under this speciﬁcation, and it sometimes become stronger.
In even columns, we propose further robustness checks by restricting our sample to ﬁrms with head-
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